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Abstract
We study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with
a continuum of endogenous wages. We derive in closed form the effects of
reforming nonlinearly an arbitrary tax system, by showing that this problem
can be formalized as an integral equation. Our tax incidence formulas are valid
both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous.
We show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom,
if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive, the general-equilibrium
trickle-down forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates
on high incomes. We finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal
taxes.
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Introduction
This paper connects two classical strands of the public finance literature: the study
of tax incidence (Harberger (1962); Kotlikoff and Summers (1987); Fullerton and
Metcalf (2002)) and that of optimal nonlinear income taxation in partial and general
equilibrium (Mirrlees (1971); Stiglitz (1982); Diamond (1998); Saez (2001); Rothschild
and Scheuer (2013)). The objective of the tax incidence analysis is to characterize
the first-order effects of locally reforming a given, potentially suboptimal, tax system
on the distribution of individual wages, labor supplies, and utilities, as well as on
government revenue and social welfare. We derive closed-form analytical formulas
for the incidence of any tax reform in a framework with a continuum of endogenous
wages and arbitrarily nonlinear taxes. A characterization of optimal taxes in general
equilibrium is then obtained by imposing that no tax reform has a positive impact
on social welfare.
In our baseline environment, there is a continuum of skills that are imperfectly
substitutable in production. Agents choose their labor supply optimally given their
wage and the tax schedule. The wage, or marginal productivity, of each worker is
decreasing in the aggregate labor of its own skill type, and increasing (resp., decreas-
ing) in the aggregate labor of the skills that are complements (resp., substitutes) in
production. We microfound the production function in an environment with a tech-
nology over a continuum of tasks to which skills are endogenously assigned, as in
Costinot and Vogel (2010); Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015).
In the model with exogenous wages, the effects of a tax change on the labor effort
of a given agent can be easily derived as a function of the elasticity of labor supply
(Saez (2001)). The key difficulty in general equilibrium is that this initial response
impacts the wage, and thus the labor effort, of every other individual. This further
affects the wage distribution, which in turn influences labor supply decisions, and so
on. Solving for the fixed point in the labor supply adjustment of each worker is the
key step in the tax incidence analysis and the primary technical challenge of our pa-
per. We show that this a priori complex problem can be mathematically formalized
as an integral equation. The tools of the theory of integral equations allow us to
derive an analytical solution to this problem for a general production function and
arbitrary tax reforms. Furthermore, this solution has a clear economic interpretation
and is expressed in terms of meaningful, and potentially empirically estimable, la-
bor supply, labor demand, and cross-wage elasticities. It is then straightforward to
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derive the incidence of tax reforms on individual wages and utilities. Importantly,
the elasticities we uncover in general equilibrium are sufficient statistics (see Chetty
(2009)): conditional on these parameters, our incidence formulas are valid regardless
of whether the underlying structure of the assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or
endogenous.
Next, we analyze the aggregate effect of tax reforms on government revenue and
social welfare. We derive a general formula that establishes how the deadweight
loss of taxes is modified in general equilibrium. We show analytically that the gov-
ernment's revenue gain from reforming the tax schedule in the direction of higher
progressivity is larger (the excess burden is smaller) than the conventional formula
assuming exogenous wages would predict, if the marginal tax rates being perturbed
are initially increasing with income.1 This result, which is robust to various ex-
tensions of our baseline environment, means that accounting for the conventional
trickle-down forces (Stiglitz (1982); Rothschild and Scheuer (2013)) makes raising
top-income marginal tax rates more, not less, desirable than in partial equilibrium.
Numerical simulations show that in the U.S., assuming exogenous wages implies that
33 percent of the revenue from a tax increase is lost through behavioral responses,
while only 17 percent to 29 percent are lost in general equilibrium.
Finally, we derive the implications of our analysis for the optimal tax schedule.
In the main body, we focus on deriving a novel characterization which depends on a
parsimonious number of parameters that can be easily estimated empirically. To do
so, we specialize our production function to have a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) between pairs of types. This leads to particularly sharp and transparent the-
oretical insights. First, we obtain an optimal taxation formula that generalizes the
partial-equilibrium results of Diamond (1998); Saez (2001). We show that marginal
tax rates should be lower (resp., higher) for agents whose welfare is valued less (resp.,
more) than average, because an increase in the marginal tax rate of a given skill type
increases their wage at the expense of all the other types. These general equilibrium
forces reinforce the U-shaped pattern of optimal taxes. We derive the optimal top tax
rate in closed form in terms of the labor supply elasticity, the elasticity of substitution,
and the Pareto parameter of the tail of the income distribution.
1In this paper, by progressivity we mean increasing marginal tax rates. Another definition
would be increasing average, rather than marginal, tax rates. Our result regarding the benefits of
raising the progressivity of the tax schedule (if the initial tax code has increasing marginal tax rates)
holds under both definitions.
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Related literature. This paper is related to the literature on tax incidence: see,
e.g., Harberger (1962); Shoven and Whalley (1984) for the seminal papers, Kotlikoff
and Summers (1987); Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for comprehensive surveys, and
Hines (2009) for emphasizing the importance of general equilibrium (GE) in taxa-
tion. We extend this analysis to the workhorse model of nonlinear income taxation
of Mirrlees (1971). The optimal taxation problem in GE with nonlinear tax instru-
ments has originally been studied by Stiglitz (1982) in a model with two types. A
series of important contributions by Scheuer (2014); Rothschild and Scheuer (2013,
2014); Scheuer and Werning (2016, 2017); Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015); Ales and
Sleet (2016); Ales, Bellofatto, and Wang (2017) form the modern analysis of optimal
nonlinear taxes in GE.2 Our setting is distinct from those of Scheuer and Werning
(2016, 2017), whose modeling of the technology is such that the optimum tax formula
of Mirrlees (1971) extends to general production functions; we discuss in detail the
difference between our framework and theirs in Appendix A.1.
Most closely related to our paper, Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) generalize Stiglitz
(1982) to a Roy setting with several sectors and a continuum of skills in each sector,
leading to a multidimensional screening problem,3 and Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015)
microfound the production function by incorporating an assignment model (as in Sat-
tinger (1975); Teulings (1995); Costinot and Vogel (2010)) into the optimal taxation
framework. The key distinction between these papers and ours is that they use mech-
anism design tools that are only able to characterize the optimum taxes, whereas we
study more generally the tax incidence problem by extending the variational, or tax
reform, approach introduced by Piketty (1997); Saez (2001); Golosov et al. (2014)
to GE environments. This is important as we show that the (potentially suboptimal)
tax system to which the reform is applied is a crucial determinant of the direction
and size of the GE effects. Our paper also differs from those mentioned above as it
is in the sufficient statistic tradition (Chetty (2009)): conditional on the wage elas-
ticities that we introduce, our baseline tax incidence formulas remain identical for
2Rothschild and Scheuer (2016); Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) study optimal taxes in
the presence of rent-seeking. In this paper we abstract from such considerations and assume that
individuals are paid their marginal productivity. Kushnir and Zubrickas (2018) set up a Mirrlees
model in which general equilibrium effects occur through product prices rather than wages. Jones
(2019) characterizes the optimal top tax rate in an environment where economics growth is driven
by endogenous innovation.
3Our baseline model is simpler than theirs, as different types earn different wages (there is no
overlap in the wage distributions). In the former version of this paper we extended our results to
the Roy model.
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several underlying primitive environments (namely, whether the assignment of skills
to tasks is fixed or endogenous to taxes). Finally, our characterization of optimal
income tax rates is also novel: assuming a simple technology leads to parsimonious
and transparent formulas generalizing those of Diamond (1998); Saez (2001).
Our paper is also related to the literature that derives simple closed-form expres-
sions for the effects of tax policy in general equilibrium. Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2017) and Antras, De Gortari, and Itskhoki (2017) do so by restricting the
production function to be CES and the tax schedule to be CRP. On the one hand, our
model is simpler than theirs as we study a static and closed economy with exogenous
skills. On the other hand, for most of our theoretical analysis we do not restrict our-
selves to particular functional forms for taxes and the production function. Finally,
our modeling of the production function is motived by an empirical literature that
estimates the impact of immigration on the wage distribution and groups workers
according to their position in this distribution (Card (1990); Borjas, Freeman, Katz,
DiNardo, and Abowd (1997); Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013)). This empir-
ical literature is a useful benchmark because it studies the impact of labor supply
shocks of certain skills on relative wages, which is exactly the channel we want to
analyze in our tax setting.
1 Environment
In this section we set up the baseline version of our model. Our main results can be
derived most transparently by assuming that individual preferences are quasilinear.
Technical details are provided in Appendix A. We extend our analysis to general
preferences in Appendix D.
1.1 Initial equilibrium
Individuals. There is a continuum of mass 1 of workers indexed by their skill
θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ¯] ⊂ R+, distributed according to the pdf f (·) and cdf F (·). Individual
preferences over consumption c and labor supply l are represented by the quasilinear
utility function c − v (l), where the disutility of labor v : R+ → R+ is twice contin-
uously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex. Individuals with skill θ
earn a wage w (θ) that they take as given. They choose their labor supply l (θ) and
earn taxable income y (θ) = w (θ) l (θ). Their consumption is equal to y (θ)−T (y (θ)),
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where T : R+ → R is a twice continuously differentiable income tax schedule. Their
optimal labor supply choice l (θ) is the solution to the first-order condition:4
v′ (l (θ)) = [1− T ′ (w (θ) l (θ))]w (θ) . (1)
We denote by U (θ) the utility attained by these agents, and by L (θ) ≡ l (θ) f (θ) the
total amount of labor supplied by individuals of type θ.
Firms. There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical firms that produce output using
the labor of every skill type θ ∈ Θ. We posit a constant returns to scale aggregate
production function F (L ) over the continuum of labor inputs L ≡ {L (θ)}s∈Θ.5
In equilibrium, firms earn no profits and the wage w (θ) is equal to the marginal
productivity of type-θ labor, that is,
w (θ) =
∂
∂L (θ)
F (L ) . (2)
Remark (Monotonicity). Without loss of generality we order the skills θ so that
the wage function θ 7→ w (θ) is strictly increasing given the tax schedule T .6 By
the Spence-Mirrlees condition, the pre-tax income function θ 7→ y (θ) is then also
strictly increasing. Therefore, there are one-to-one relationships between skills θ,
wages w (θ), and pre-tax incomes y (θ) in the initial equilibrium. We denote by
fY (y(θ)) = (y
′(θ))−1f(θ) the density of incomes and by FY the corresponding c.d.f.
Example (CES technology). The production function has a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) if
F (L ) =
[ˆ
Θ
a (θ) (L (θ))
σ−1
σ dθ
] σ
σ−1
, (3)
4The dependence of labor supply on the tax schedule T is left implicit for simplicity. Whenever
necessary, we denote the solution to (1) by l (θ;T ).
5In Section 1.3 below we provide a microfoundation of this production function. An alternative
interpretation of our framework is that different types of workers produce different types of goods
that are imperfect substitutes in household consumption.
6We can moreover assume w.l.o.g. that the skill set Θ is the interval [0, 1] and that the distribution
f (θ) is uniform, in which case θ indexes the agent's percentile in the wage distribution. Note that this
ordering remains unchanged regardless of the tax reform if the production is CES. More generally,
our tax incidence analysis does not require that the initial ordering of wages to be unaffected by tax
reforms.
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for some σ ∈ [0,∞) and a (·) ∈ R+. The wage schedule is then given by w (θ) =
a (θ) (L (θ) /F (L ))−1/σ. The cases σ = 0, σ = 1, and σ =∞ correspond respectively
to the Leontieff, Cobb-Douglas, and exogenous-wage technologies.
Government. The government chooses the twice-continuously differentiable tax
function T : R+ → R. Tax revenue is given by
R =
ˆ
Θ
T (y (θ)) f (θ) dθ.
We define the local rate of progressivity of the tax schedule T at income level y as
(minus) the elasticity of the retention rate 1− T ′ (y) with respect to income y,
p (y) ≡ −∂ ln[1− T
′ (y)]
∂ ln y
=
yT ′′ (y)
1− T ′ (y) .
Example (CRP taxes). The schedule has a constant rate of progressivity (CRP) if
T (y) = y − 1− τ
1− py
1−p, (4)
for some p < 1.7 This tax schedule is linear (resp., progressive, regressive), i.e.,
the marginal tax rates T ′ (y) and the average tax rates T (y) /y are constant (resp.,
increasing, decreasing), if p = 0 (resp., p > 0, p < 0).
Equilibrium. An equilibrium given a tax function T is a schedule of labor supplies
{l (θ)}θ∈Θ, labor demands {L (θ)}θ∈Θ, and wages {w (θ)}θ∈Θ such that equations (1)
and (2) hold, the labor markets clear: L (θ) = l (θ) f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, and the goods
market clears: F (L ) = ´
Θ
w (θ)L (θ) dθ.
1.2 Elasticities
We now define the parameters that determine the economy's adjustment to tax re-
forms, namely, the elasticities of the labor supply and labor demand curves within
each labor market θ, and the cross-price elasticities between labor markets θ, θ′.
7See, e.g., Bénabou (2002); Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017).
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Cross-wage elasticities. Consider first two distinct labor markets for skills θ and
θ′. We define the elasticity of the wage of type θ′, w (θ′), with respect to the aggregate
labor of type θ, L (θ), as
γ (θ′, θ) ≡ ∂ lnw (θ
′)
∂ lnL (θ)
=
L (θ)F ′′θ′,θ (L )
F ′θ′ (L )
, ∀θ′ 6= θ (5)
where F ′θ′ and F
′′
θ′,θ denote the first and second partial derivatives of the production
functionF with respect to the labor inputs of types θ′ and θ. The cross-wage elasticity
between two skills θ, θ′ is non-zero if they are imperfect substitutes in production.
They are Edgeworth complements if γ (θ′, θ) > 0 and substitutes if γ (θ′, θ) < 0. In
the CES example (3), γ (θ′, θ) = 1
σ
a (θ) (L (θ) /F (L ))
σ−1
σ > 0 does not depend on θ′,
implying that a change in the labor supply of skill θ has the same effect, in percentage
terms, on the wage of every skill θ′ 6= θ.
Labor demand elasticities. Next, consider the labor market for a given skill θ.
The impact of the aggregate labor effort of skill θ on its own wage, ∂ lnw(θ)
∂ lnL(θ)
, may be
different than its impact on the wage of its close neighbors θ′ ≈ θ, lim
θ′→θ
∂ lnw(θ′)
∂ lnL(θ)
=
lim
θ′→θ
γ (θ′, θ). That is, the function θ′ 7→ ∂ lnw(θ′)
∂ lnL(θ)
may be discontinuous at θ′ = θ. We
denote by γ (θ, θ) ≡ lim
θ′→θ
∂ lnw(θ′)
∂ lnL(θ)
the complementarity between θ and its neighboring
skills, and define the inverse elasticity of labor demand for skill θ, 1/εDw (θ), as size of
the jump between ∂ lnw(θ)
∂ lnL(θ)
and γ (θ, θ). Formally,
∂ lnw (θ′)
∂ lnL (θ)
≡ γ (θ′, θ)− 1
εDw (θ)
δ (θ′ − θ) , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ2, (6)
where δ (·) denotes the Dirac delta function. In the CES example (3), this own-wage
effect εDw (θ) = σ > 0 captures the fact that the marginal productivity of skill θ
is decreasing, whereas θ is Edgeworth complement with every other skill θ′. Note
that the tax incidence formulas we derive in this paper are valid whether such a
discontinuity indeed occurs (e.g., if the production function is CES) or not (e.g., in
the microfoundation of Section 1.3).
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Labor supply elasticities. Finally, we define the elasticities of labor supply l (θ)
with respect to the retention rate r (θ) ≡ 1− T ′ (y (θ)) and the wage w (θ) as
εSr (θ) ≡
∂ ln l (θ)
∂ ln r (θ)
=
e (θ)
1 + p (y (θ)) e (θ)
, εSw (θ) ≡
∂ ln l (θ)
∂ lnw (θ)
= (1− p (y (θ))) εSr (θ) ,
(7)
where e (θ) ≡ v′(l(θ))
l(θ)v′′(l(θ)) . The variable ε
S
r (θ) is an elasticity along the nonlinear budget
constraint:8 it differs from the standard elasticity parameter e (θ) as it accounts for
the fact that if the tax schedule is nonlinear, a change in individual labor supply l (θ)
causes endogenously a change in the marginal tax rate T ′ (w (θ) l (θ)) captured by the
rate of progressivity p (y (θ)) of the tax schedule, and hence a further labor supply
adjustment e (θ). Solving for the fixed point leads to the correction term p (y (θ)) e (θ)
in the denominator of εSr (θ).
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1.3 Microfoundation and sufficient statistics
The production function we introduced in Section 1.1 can be microfounded as the
reduced form of an underlying model of assignment between the worker skills and the
tasks involved in production. That is, our analysis encompasses the cases of both fixed
and endogenous assignment. To show this, we set up a model that extends Costinot
and Vogel (2010) by allowing workers to choose their labor supply endogenously and
the government to tax labor income nonlinearly.10 The technical details are gathered
in Appendix A.2.
The final consumption good is produced using a CES technology over a continuum
of tasks ψ ∈ Ψ, indexed by their skill intensity (e.g., manual, routine, abstract, etc.).
The output of each task is in turn produced linearly using the labor of the skills
θ ∈ Θ that are endogenously assigned to this task. Assuming that high-skilled workers
have a comparative advantage in tasks with high skill intensities, the market clearing
conditions for intermediate goods determine a one-to-one matching functionM : Θ→
Ψ between skills and tasks in equilibrium  there is positive assortative matching.
8See also Jacquet and Lehmann (2017).
9Since there is a one-to-one map between types θ and incomes y (θ), one can equivalently index
these elasticities by income: εSr (y (θ)) ≡ εSr (θ). We use these two notations interchangeably in the
sequel, and analogously for the labor demand elasticities εDw (θ) defined above. On the other hand,
the natural change of variables between types θ and incomes y (θ) for the cross-wage elasticities
is γ(y(θ1), y(θ2)) = (y
′(θ2))−1 γ(θ1, θ2), and analogously for the resolvent cross-wage elasticities
Γ(θ1, θ2) defined below.
10Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015) characterize optimal taxes in such a model.
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It is straightforward to show that this model admits a reduced-form representation
where the production of the final good is performed by a technology over skills. This
reduced-form technology inherits the CES structure (3) of the original production
function over intermediate tasks, except that the technology coefficients a (·) now
depend on the matching function M , and are thus endogenous to taxes.
Crucially, we show that tax reforms affect the equilibrium assignment M only
through their effect on individual labor supply choices {L (θ)}θ∈Θ. Mathematically,
this is a consequence of the fact that, fixing labor supplies, none of the equations that
determine the equilibrium depend explicitly on the tax schedule T . Intuitively, this
is because individuals always choose the task that maximizes their net wage. Since
a tax reform does not alter directly the ranking of net wages, as long as marginal
tax rates are below 100 percent, taxes affect the equilibrium sorting of skills only
indirectly through the labor supply responses that they induce. Hence the techno-
logical coefficients a (·;M) of the reduced-form technology described above can be
written without loss of generality as a(·; {L (θ)}θ∈Θ). Substituting these parameters
into (3) yields a production function with the general form postulated in Section 1.1,
F({L (θ)}θ∈Θ).
The implied cross-wage elasticities γ (θ′, θ) = L(θ)F ′
θ′
∂2F
∂L(θ)∂L(θ′) , as defined in equation
(5), already account for the potential reassignment of workers into new tasks.11 That
is, they represent the impact of an increase in the labor supply of skill θ on the
marginal productivity of skill θ′, leaving everyone else's labor supply unchanged and,
if assignment is endogenous, letting workers be reassigned into different tasks  i.e.,
taking into account the adjustment of the technological coefficients a(·, {L (θ)}θ∈Θ). It
follows from this discussion that these cross-wage elasticities are sufficient statistics :
once expressed as a function of these parameters, the tax incidence formulas that we
derive in Sections 2 and 3 are valid both when the underlying structure of assignment
is fixed and when it is endogenous to tax reforms.
Graphical representation. We now represent graphically the cross-wage elastic-
ities that arise in the model we just described. As we detail in Section 4 below, we
11Note moreover that, while in a setting with exogenous assignment the inverse labor demand
elasticities 1/εDw are generally non-zero (i.e., there is a discontinuity in the schedule of elasticities
∂ lnw(θ′)
∂ lnL(θ) as θ
′ ≈ θ), instead with costless reassignment such a discontinuity would cause workers to
migrate to neighboring tasks, leading to perfectly elastic labor demand curves (i.e., 1/εDw = 0). Our
tax incidence formulas are naturally valid in both cases.
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follow the calibration of Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015) who assume a Cobb-Douglas
technology over tasks. We compare these elasticities with those obtained in our base-
line model of Section 1.1, assuming a CES production function over skills with two
calibrations of the elasticity of substitution. The first consists of simply shutting
down the endogenous reassignment channel in the former model while keeping all of
the other parameters unchanged, hence assuming a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion over skills (σ = 1). The second, more relevant, calibration consists of directly
estimating a CES production function over labor supplies: we then use the value
σ = 3.1 estimated by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017).
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the resulting cross-wage elasticities γ (y, y∗) in
the model of endogenous assignment, in response to changes in the labor supplies
of agents who earn y∗ ∈ {$25, 000 ; $80, 000 ; $200, 000}. They are V-shaped and
increasing in the distance |y − y∗|. A higher labor effort of agents y∗ lowers wages
on a non-degenerate interval of incomes around y∗ and raises those of much higher
or much lower incomes. Note that the shape of the cross-wage elasticities in Figure
1 is similar to those of Teulings (2005). The right panel compares these elasticities
with those obtained with a CES production function (3) and fixed assignment, for
y∗ = $80, 000 and σ ∈ {1 ; 3.1}. In this case, as shown above, the wage of agent
y∗ decreases, while everyone else's wages increase by the same amount in percentage
terms. The discontinuity at y∗ is represented by the Dirac arrows in the figure.
Letting workers be reassigned to different tasks in response to an exogenous increase
in the labor supply at y∗ thus spreads out the cross-wage effects around y ≈ y∗ and
removes the discontinuity that arises when matching is kept fixed.
2 Incidence of tax reforms
Consider a given initial, potentially suboptimal, tax schedule T , e.g., the U.S. tax
code. In this section we derive closed-form formulas for the first-order effects of
arbitrary local perturbations of this tax schedule (tax reforms) on individual labor
supplies, wages and utilities. The proofs are gathered in Appendix B.
2.1 Effects on labor supply
As in the case of exogenous wages (Saez (2001)), analyzing the incidence of tax re-
forms relies crucially on solving for each individual's change in labor supply in terms
10
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Va
lu
e 
of
 C
ro
ss
 W
ag
e 
El
as
tic
ity
Figure 1: Left panel: Cross wage elasticities y 7→ γ (y, y∗) in the model with endogenous costless
reassignment of skills to tasks with y∗ equal to $25,000 (dotted curve), $80,000 (dashed curve),
$200,000 (dashed-dotted curve). Right panel: Comparison of the cross-wage elasticities y 7→ γ (y, y∗)
with y∗ = $80, 000 in the models with endogenous assignment (solid curve) and with exogenous
assignment (CES production) for σ = 1 (dashed line) and σ = 3.1 (dashed-dotted line).
of behavioral elasticities. This problem is much more involved in general equilibrium.
If wages are exogenous, a change in the tax rate of a given individual, say θ, induces
only a change in the labor effort of that agent (measured by the elasticity (7)). In the
general equilibrium setting, instead, this labor supply response of type θ affects the
wage, and hence the labor supply, of every other skill θ′ ∈ Θ. This in turn feeds back
into the wage distribution, which further impacts labor supplies, and so on. Repre-
senting the total effect of this infinite sequence caused by arbitrarily non-linear tax
reforms is thus a complex task.12 The key step towards the general characterization of
the economic incidence of taxes, and our first main theoretical contribution, consists
of showing that this problem can be mathematically formulated as an integral equa-
tion (Lemma 1).13 Thus, we can apply the tools and results of the theory of integral
equations to solve for the labor supply adjustments in closed-form (Proposition 1).
The incidence on wages and utilities is then straightforward to obtain (Corollary 2).
12We could define, for each specific tax reform one might consider implementing, a policy elas-
ticity (as in, e.g., Hendren (2015), Piketty and Saez (2013)), equal to each individual's total labor
supply response to the corresponding reform. The key challenge of the incidence problem consists
of expressing this total labor supply response in terms of the structural elasticity parameters intro-
duced in Section 1.2. In other words, Proposition 1 below derives the policy elasticity in terms of
these structural parameters.
13The general theory of linear integral equations is exposed in, e.g., Tricomi (1985) and Zemyan
(2012). Moreover, closed-form solutions can be derived in many special cases (see Polyanin and
Manzhirov (2008)) and numerical techniques are widely available (see Section 4).
11
Tax reforms and Gateaux derivatives. Consider an arbitrary non-linear reform
of the initial tax schedule T (·). Formally, this tax reform can be represented by a
continuously differentiable function Tˆ (·) on R+, so that the perturbed tax schedule
is T (·) + µTˆ (·), where µ ∈ R parametrizes the size of the reform.14 Our aim is to
compute the first-order effect of this perturbation on individual labor supply (i.e., the
solution to the first-order condition (1)), when the magnitude of the tax change is
small, i.e., as µ → 0. This is formally given by the Gateaux derivative of the labor
supply functional T 7→ l (θ;T ) in the direction Tˆ , that is,15
lˆ (θ) ≡ lim
µ→0
1
µ
[
l(θ;T + µTˆ )− l (θ;T )
]
.
The variable lˆ (θ) gives the change in the labor supply of type θ in response to the
tax reform Tˆ , taking into account all the general equilibrium effects induced by the
endogeneity of wages. We define analogously the changes in individual wages wˆ (θ),
utilities Uˆ (θ) and government revenue Rˆ.
Integral equation (IE). The following lemma provides an implicit characteriza-
tion of the incidence of an arbitrary tax reform Tˆ on labor supplies.
Lemma 1. The effect of a tax reform Tˆ of the initial tax schedule T on individual
labor supplies, lˆ (·), is the solution to the functional equation: for all θ ∈ Θ,
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
= −εr (θ) Tˆ
′ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) + εw (θ)
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ, θ′)
lˆ (θ′)
l (θ′)
dθ′, (8)
where εr (θ) and εw (θ) are the elasticities of equilibrium labor of skill θ with respect
to the retention rate and the wage, defined respectively by
1
εr (θ)
≡ 1
εSr (θ)
+
1
εDw (θ)
and
1
εw (θ)
≡ 1
εSw (θ)
+
1
εDw (θ)
.
Formula (8) is a linear Fredholm integral equation of the second kind with kernel
εw (θ) γ (θ, θ
′). Its unknown, which appears under the integral sign, is the function
14An example of this general definition consists of increasing the marginal tax rate on a small
income interval, and hence the total tax payment by a constant lump-sum amount above that interval
(Piketty (1997); Saez (2001)). We formalize and analyze this important class of perturbations in
Section 3.1 below.
15The notation lˆ (θ) ignores for simplicity the dependence of this derivatives on the initial tax
schedule T and on the tax reform Tˆ .
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θ 7→ lˆ (θ). Before deriving its solution, we start by providing the economic meaning
of this equation.
Due to the reform, the retention rate r (θ) = 1−T ′ (y (θ)) of individual θ changes,
in percentage terms, by rˆ(θ)
r(θ)
= − Tˆ ′(y(θ))
1−T ′(y(θ)) . This tax reform induces a direct per-
centage change in labor effort l (θ) equal to εr (θ)
rˆ(θ)
r(θ)
, where εr (θ) is the elasticity
of equilibrium labor on the market for skill θ. This is the partial-equilibrium ad-
justment, obtained by considering the labor market θ in isolation and ignoring the
cross-price effects between markets. It resembles the expression εSr (θ)
rˆ(θ)
r(θ)
one would
get assuming exogenous wages, with one difference: if the marginal product of labor
is decreasing, i.e., the labor demand curve is downward sloping, then the initial labor
supply adjustment (say, decrease) due to the tax reform causes an own-wage increase
determined by 1/εDw (θ), which in turn raises labor supply and dampens the initial
response  hence the relevant elasticity satisfies εr (θ) ≤ εSr (θ).
Now, in general equilibrium, the labor supply of type θ is also impacted indirectly
by the change in all other individuals' labor supplies, due to the skill complementari-
ties in production. Specifically, the percentage change in labor supply of each type θ′,
lˆ(θ′)
l(θ′) , triggers a change in the wage of type θ equal to γ (θ, θ
′) lˆ(θ
′)
l(θ′) , and thus a further
adjustment in labor supply equal to εw (θ) γ (θ, θ
′) lˆ(θ
′)
l(θ′) . Summing these effects over
skills θ′ ∈ Θ leads to formula (8).
Solution to the IE and resolvent. We now characterize the solution to the
integral equation (8).
Proposition 1. Assume that the condition
´
Θ2
|εw (θ) γ (θ, θ′) |2dθdθ′ < 1 holds.16
The unique solution to the integral equation (8) is given by:
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
= −εr (θ) Tˆ
′ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) − εw (θ)
ˆ
Θ
Γ (θ, θ′) εr (θ′)
Tˆ ′ (y (θ′))
1− T ′ (y (θ′))dθ
′, (9)
where for all (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ2, the resolvent Γ (θ, θ′) is defined by
Γ (θ, θ′) ≡
∞∑
n=1
Γn (θ, θ
′) , (10)
16This technical condition ensures that the infinite series (10) converges. We provide sufficient
conditions on primitives such that this condition holds. In more general cases it can be easily verified
numerically. Finally, when it is not satisfied, we can more generally express the solution to (8) with a
representation similar to (9) but with a more complex resolvent (see Section 2.4 in Zemyan (2012)).
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with Γ1 (θ, θ
′) = γ (θ, θ′) and for all n ≥ 2,
Γn (θ, θ
′) =
ˆ
Θ
Γn−1 (θ, θ′′) εw (θ′′) γ (θ′′, θ′) dθ′′.
Sufficient conditions on primitives ensuring the convergence of the resolvent (10) are
that the production function is CES, the initial tax schedule is CRP, and the disutility
of labor is isoelastic.
The mathematical representation (9) of the solution to the integral equation (8)
has the following economic meaning. The first term on the right hand side of (9),
−εr (θ) Tˆ ′(y(θ))1−T ′(y(θ)) , is the partial-equilibrium effect of the reform on labor supply l (θ),
already described in equation (8). The second (integral) term accounts for the cross-
wage effects in general equilibrium. Note that this integral term has the same struc-
ture as the corresponding term in formula (8), except that: (i) the unknown endoge-
nous labor supply change lˆ(θ
′)
l(θ′) is now replaced by the (known) partial-equilibrium
impact −εr (θ′) Tˆ ′(y(θ′))1−T ′(y(θ′)) ; and (ii) the structural cross-wage elasticity γ (θ, θ′) is re-
placed by the resolvent cross-wage elasticity Γ (θ, θ′).17
The resolvent elasticity Γ (θ, θ′), defined by the series (10), expresses the total
effect of the labor supply of type θ′ on the wage of type θ. That is, it accounts for the
infinite sequence of general-equilibrium adjustments induced by the complementarities
in production. The first iterated kernel (n = 1) in the series (10) is simply Γ1 (θ, θ
′) =
γ (θ, θ′). It accounts for the impact of the labor supply of type θ′ on the wage of
type θ through direct cross-wage effects. The second iterated kernel (n = 2) in (10)
accounts for the impact of the labor supply of θ′ on the wage of θ, indirectly through
the behavior of third parties θ′′. This term reads
Γ2 (θ, θ
′) =
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ, θ′′) εw (θ′′) γ (θ′′, θ′) dθ′′. (11)
For any θ′, a percentage change in the labor supply of θ′ induces a percentage change
17For applied purposes, one can use both the structural parameters γ (θ, θ′) or the resolvent
parameters Γ (θ, θ′) as primitive cross-wage elasticity variables  our tax incidence formulas can be
expressed in terms of either of them. Some empirical studies may evaluate the structural parameters
γ (θ, θ′) of the production function directly, while others may estimate the full general-equilibrium
impact Γ (θ, θ′), including the spillovers generated by the initial shock. In the latter case, it may
be useful to recover the structural elasticities γ (θ, θ′) as a function of the higher-order elasticities
Γ (θ, θ′), e.g., for counterfactual analysis. It is straightforward to show that γ (θ, θ′) can be expressed
as the solution to an integral equation with a kernel determined by Γ (θ, θ′).
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in the wage of any other type θ′′ by γ (θ′′, θ′), and hence a percentage change in the
labor supply of θ′′ given by εw (θ′′) γ (θ′′, θ′). This in turn affects the wage of type θ by
the amount γ (θ, θ′′) εw (θ′′) γ (θ′′, θ′). Summing over all intermediate types θ′′ leads to
expression (11). An inductive reasoning shows similarly that the terms n ≥ 3 in the
resolvent series (10) account for the impact of the labor supply of θ′ on the wage of θ
through n successive stages of cross-wage effects, e.g., for n = 3, θ′ → θ′′ → θ′′′ → θ.
The case of separable cross-wage elasticities. A particularly tractable special
case of Proposition 1 is obtained when the cross-wage elasticities are multiplicatively
separable between skills. This occurs in particular when the production function is
CES (in which case γ (θ, θ′) depends only on θ′) or, more generally, homothetic with a
single aggregator (HSA, see Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017)). The following corollary
shows that in this case, each round of general equilibrium effects, i.e., each term in the
series (10), is a fraction of the first round  so that the resolvent cross-wage elasticity
Γ (θ, θ′) is directly proportional to the structural elasticity γ (θ, θ′).
Corollary 1. Suppose that there exist functions γ1 and γ2 such that for all (θ, θ
′),
γ (θ, θ′) = γ1 (θ) γ2 (θ′). The resolvent cross-wage elasticities are then given by
Γ (θ, θ′) =
γ (θ, θ′)
1− ´
Θ
εw (s) γ (s, s) ds
. (12)
In particular, if the production function is CES, the integral in the denominator of
(12) is equal to 1
σEyE [yεw (y)].
2.2 Effects on wages and utility
We can now easily obtain the incidence of an arbitrary tax reform Tˆ on individual
wages and utilities.
Corollary 2. The incidence of a tax reform Tˆ of the initial tax schedule T on indi-
vidual wages, wˆ (·), is given by
wˆ (θ)
w (θ)
=
1
εSw (θ)
[
εSr (θ)
Tˆ ′ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) +
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
]
, (13)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where the labor supply response lˆ (θ) is given by (9). The incidence on
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individual utilities, Uˆ (·), is given by
Uˆ (θ) = −Tˆ (y (θ)) + (1− T ′ (y (θ))) y (θ) wˆ (θ)
w (θ)
. (14)
Equation (13) gives the changes in individual wages due to the tax reform Tˆ , as a
function of the labor supply changes characterized by Proposition 1. Its interpreta-
tion is straightforward: multiplying both sides of (13) by εSw (θ) gives the percentage
adjustment of type-θ labor supply, lˆ(θ)
l(θ)
, as the sum of its response in the case of
exogenous wages, −εSr Tˆ
′
1−T ′ , and the effect induced by the percentage wage change,
εSw × wˆw .
Equation (14) gives the impact of the reform on individual welfare. The first
term in the right hand side, −Tˆ (y (θ)), is due to the fact that a higher tax payment
makes the individual poorer and hence reduces utility. The second term accounts
for the change in net income due to the wage adjustment wˆ (θ), given by equation
(13). If wages were exogenous, so that wˆ (θ) = 0 in (14), the utility of agent θ would
respond one-for-one to changes in the total tax payment Tˆ (y (θ)); in particular, by
the envelope theorem, it would not be affected by changes in the marginal tax rate
Tˆ ′ (y (θ)). In general equilibrium, however, this is no longer true because marginal
tax rates cause labor supply adjustments which in turn affect wages (second term in
(14)) and hence utilities. We can easily show that if all pairs of types are Edgeworth
complements and the assignment of workers to tasks is exogenous, then a higher
marginal tax rate at income y (θ) raises the utility of agents with skill θ and lowers
that of all other agents.
3 Effects of tax reforms on government revenue
The impact of a tax reform Tˆ on government revenue follows directly from the changes
in equilibrium labor and wages:
Rˆ(Tˆ ) =
ˆ
Θ
Tˆ (y (θ)) f (θ) dθ +
ˆ
Θ
T ′ (y (θ))
[
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
+
wˆ (θ)
w (θ)
]
y (θ) f (θ) dθ. (15)
The first term on the right hand side of (15) is the statutory effect of the tax reform
Tˆ (·), i.e., the mechanical change in government revenue assuming that the individual's
labor supply and wage remain constant. The second term is the behavioral effect of
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the reform. The labor supply and wage adjustments lˆ (θ) and wˆ (θ) both induce
a change in government revenue proportional to the marginal tax rate T ′ (y (θ)).
Summing these effects over all individuals using the density f (·) leads to equation
(15). The remainder of this section is devoted to deriving the economic implications
of this formula. The proofs and technical details are gathered in Appendix C.
3.1 Preliminaries
Elementary tax reforms. From now on, we focus without loss of generality on a
specific class of elementary tax reforms, represented by the step function Tˆ (y) =
(1− FY (y∗))−1 I{y≥y∗} for a given income level y∗.18 That is, the total tax liability
increases by the constant amount (1− FY (y∗))−1 for any income y above y∗, and the
marginal tax rates are perturbed by the Dirac delta function at income y∗, i.e. Tˆ ′ (y) =
(1− FY (y∗))−1 δ (y − y∗). Intuitively, this reform consists of raising the marginal tax
rate at only one income level y∗ ∈ R+, which implies a uniform increase in the total
tax payment of agents with income y > y∗.19 The normalization by (1− FY (y∗))−1
implies that the statutory increase in government revenue due to the reform (i.e., the
first term on the r.h.s. of (15)) is equal to $1. We denote by Rˆ (y∗) the total effect
(15) of this elementary tax reform on government revenue.20
Exogenous wage benchmark. In the case of exogenous wages, the incidence
on government revenue is given by expression (15) with wˆ (θ) = 0 and lˆ (θ) =
−εSr (θ) Tˆ
′(y(θ))
1−T ′(y(θ)) . Applying this formula to the elementary tax reform at income
18Note that the function I{y≥y∗} is not differentiable. We can nevertheless use our theory to
analyze this reform by applying (9) to a sequence of smooth perturbations {Tˆ ′n (y)}n≥1 that converges
to the Dirac delta function δ(y − y∗). This notation simplifies the exposition and is made only for
convenience. All our formulas can be easily written for any smooth tax reform Tˆ rather than step
functions.
19Heuristically, consider a perturbation that raises the marginal tax rate by dT ′ on a small income
interval [y∗ − dy, y∗], so that the total tax payment above income y∗ raises by the amount dT ′ × dy
equal to, say, $1. This class of tax reforms has been introduced by Piketty (1997); Saez (2001).
Then shrink the size of the income interval on which the tax rate is increased, i.e. dy → 0, while
keeping the increase in the tax payment above y∗ fixed at $1. The limit of the marginal tax rate
increase dT ′ is the Dirac measure at y∗, and the change in the total tax bill converges to its c.d.f.,
the step function I{y≥y∗}.
20Any tax reform Tˆ can be expressed as a linear combination of such income-specific elementary
perturbations: the incidence on tax revenue is given by Rˆ(Tˆ ) = ´ Rˆ (y∗) (1− FY (y∗)) Tˆ ′ (y∗) dy∗.
See Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2014) for details.
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y∗ easily leads to (see Saez (2001)):
Rˆex (y∗) = 1− T ′ (y∗) ε
S
r (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) . (16)
Equation (16) expresses the impact of an increase in the marginal tax rate at income
y∗ as the sum of the statutory increase in government revenue, which is normalized
to $1 by construction, and the behavioral revenue loss equal to the product of: (i) the
endogenous reduction in the labor income of agent y∗, y
∗
1−T ′(y∗)ε
S
r (y
∗); (ii) the share
T ′ (y∗) of this income change that accrues to the government; and (iii) the hazard
rate of the income distribution, fY (y
∗)
1−FY (y∗) . The hazard rate is a cost-benefit ratio that
measures the fraction fY (y
∗) of agents whose labor supply is distorted by the reform,
relative to the fraction 1−FY (y∗) of agents whose tax bill increases lump-sum. Note
that the second term in the right hand side of (16), εSr
T ′
1−T ′
y∗fY
1−FY , is the marginal
excess burden of a tax reform: it captures how much revenue, per unit of mechanical
increase in taxes, is lost through adjustments in behavior.
3.2 Effects on government revenue
We now derive and analyze the incidence of tax reforms on government revenue in gen-
eral equilibrium and compare it to the expression (16) obtained assuming exogenous
wages.
Proposition 2. The incidence of the elementary tax reform at income y∗ on govern-
ment revenue is given by
Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗) + εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗) (17)
×
ˆ [
T ′ (y∗)
(
1 + εSw (y
∗)
)− T ′ (y) (1 + εSw (y))] Γ¯ (y, y∗) yfY (y)1− FY (y∗)dy
where Γ¯ (y, y∗) ≡ (1+ εSw(y)
εDw (y)
)−1
Γ (y, y∗) are normalized resolvent cross-wage elasticities.
To understand formula (17), it is useful to first sketch its proof. The direct effect of
the marginal tax rate increase at income y∗ is to lower the labor supply of these agents
proportionally to εr (y
∗). This induces two additional effects in general equilibrium.
First, complementarities in production imply that the wage of any agent with income
y 6= y∗ changes (say, decreases), in percentage terms, by Γ (y, y∗) εr (y∗), so that their
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income decreases by
(
1 + εSw (y)
)
y Γ (y, y∗) εr (y∗). A share T ′ (y) of this income loss
accrues to the government, leading to the second term in the square brackets of (17).
Second, the non-constant marginal product of labor implies that the wage of agents
with income y∗ changes (say, increases), in percentage terms, by 1
εDw (y
∗)εr (y
∗). Thus
their income increases by
(
1 + εSw (y
∗)
)
y∗ 1
εDw (y
∗)εr (y
∗), a share T ′ (y∗) of which accrues
to the government. The key step is then to sum over the whole population and apply
Euler's homogeneous function theorem. Constant returns to scale imply that the
own-wage gains of agents with income y∗ are exactly compensated by the aggregate
cross-wage losses of the other incomes y 6= y∗.21 This gives an expression for the
own-wage elasticity 1
εDw (y
∗) as an integral of the cross-wage elasticities Γ (y, y
∗) and
leads to the first term in the square brackets of (17).
We now derive the economic implications of Proposition 2. To do so, assume that
the labor supply elasticities εSw (·) are constant (independent of y), which occurs if
the disutility of labor is isoelastic and the initial tax schedule is CRP. Since the wage
changes of all agents cancel in the aggregate by Euler's theorem, this assumption
implies that the income changes of all agents also cancel once we account for the
labor supply adjustments. That is, the reshuing of wages due to the tax reform
has distributional effects but keeps the economy's aggregate income constant. This
observation turns out to be crucial, as we now discuss.
Linear tax schedule. Suppose first that the initial tax schedule is linear. Since
the elasticities εSw (·) are constant, they can be taken out of the integral in formula
(17) and we immediately obtain that the square bracket is equal to zero. Indeed,
by Euler's theorem and the fact that every agent faces the same marginal tax rate,
the government's tax revenue gain coming from the higher income of agents y∗ is
exactly compensated by the tax revenue gains or losses coming from the rest of the
population. Therefore, tax reforms have the same effect on tax revenue as in the
environment with exogenous wages.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the disutility of labor is isoelastic and the initial tax sched-
ule is linear. Then the incidence of an arbitrary tax reform on government revenue
21Euler's homogeneous function theorem in its most standard form is written in terms of the
structural cross-wage elasticities γ (y, y∗). This first round of wage changes then induces labor supply
changes, which in turn lead to further rounds of own- and cross-wage effects in general equilibrium.
Because Euler's theorem applies at every stage, the aggregate effect of all these wage adjustments
is again equal to zero, so that the relationship can be expressed in terms of the resolvent cross-wage
elasticities Γ (y, y∗).
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is identical to that obtained assuming exogenous wages: Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗) for all y∗.
Non-linear tax schedule. Suppose now, more generally, that the initial tax sched-
ule is non-linear. As above, aggregate income remains unchanged in response to a
tax reform. However, the distributional implications of the tax reform now lead to
non-trivial effects on government revenue  i.e., the square bracket in formula (17)
is non-zero. Indeed, a zero-sum transfer of income from one agent to another is no
longer neutral since these workers pay different tax rates to the government on their
respective income gains and losses. To further characterize the general-equilibrium
contribution to government revenue when the tax schedule is non-linear, assume that
the elasticities of labor demand εDw (·) are also constant, which occurs either when the
production function is CES, or in the microfoundation of Section 1.3. The general
formula of Proposition 2 can then be simplified as follows.
Corollary 4. Suppose that the disutility of labor is isoelastic, the initial tax schedule
is CRP, and the labor demand elasticities are constant. We then have
Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗) + εr
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗)(1 + ε
S
w) (18)
×
{
1
εDw
(T ′ (y∗)− E [T ′ (y)])− 1
y∗fY (y∗)
Cov
(
T ′ (y) ; y Γ¯ (y, y∗)
)}
.
(i) If the production function is CES, then the covariance term on the right hand
side of (18) is constant.22 Letting φ = 1+ε
S
w
σ+εSw
and T¯ ′ = E [yT ′ (y)] /Ey, we then obtain
Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗) + φ εSr
T ′ (y∗)− T¯ ′
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) , (19)
(ii) If the production function is microfounded as in the assignment model of Sec-
tion 1.3, then 1/εDw (y) = 0 for all y, so that the first term in the curly brackets of
(18) is equal to zero.
Corollary 4 delivers novel and important insights. We first discuss both special
cases of formula (18) in turn and then conclude on the economic consequences of this
result.
22This is because we then have Γ¯ (y, y∗) = γ (y, y∗) = 1σE[y]y
∗fY (y∗).
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CES production. Consider first the case where the production function is CES.
Suppose that the marginal tax rates are increasing in the initial economy, i.e., the
rate of progressivity is p > 0. Consider a reform that raises the marginal tax rate at
income y∗. Thus the labor supply of agents with income y∗ decreases, which in turn
raises their own wage and lowers everyone else's wage. As explained above, by Euler's
homogeneous function theorem and the fact that the labor supply elasticities are
constant, the resulting income gain of agents with income y∗ is exactly compensated
in the aggregate by the income losses of the other agents y 6= y∗. Now suppose that
agents with income y∗ are high income earners, so that their marginal tax rate T ′ (y∗)
is larger than the (income-weighted) average marginal tax rate T¯ ′ in the population.
Then the government's revenue gain coming from the higher income of agents y∗,
which is proportional to T ′ (y∗), more than compensates the tax revenue loss coming
from the rest of the population, which is proportional to T¯ ′. We therefore obtain
that Rˆ (y∗) > Rˆex (y∗). Therefore, formula (19) implies that the general-equilibrium
contribution of the tax reform on government revenue is positive (resp., negative) if
the marginal tax rate at y∗ is larger (resp., smaller) than the income-weighted average
marginal tax rate in the economy. Moreover, the larger the income y∗ at which the
marginal tax rate is increased, the larger the gain in government revenue relative to
the exogenous-wage setting. That is, trickle-down forces imply higher benefits of
raising, not lowering, the marginal tax rates on high incomes.23
Endogenous assignment. Consider next the case where the production function
is microfounded as in Section 1.3, with endogenous and costless sorting of skills into
tasks. In this case, the inverse labor demand elasticities 1/εDw are equal to zero and
equation (18) implies that the general-equilibrium contribution to the excess burden
of the elementary tax reform is determined by the covariance between the initial
marginal tax rates T ′ (·) and the production complementarities Γ¯ (·, y∗) with agent
y∗. If this covariance is positive (resp., negative) at a given income y∗, then the
general-equilibrium forces raise (resp., lower) the cost of increasing the marginal tax
rate at income y∗, compared to the exogenous-wage benchmark (16). Moreover, if
this covariance is increasing with y∗ (resp., decreasing), then the general-equilibrium
forces raise (resp., lower) the cost of increasing the progressivity of the tax code.
Section 4 evaluates this formula numerically for the calibrated values of the cross-
23We would obtain the opposite result if the initial tax rate were regressive (i.e., p < 0). The
benefits of raising the top marginal tax rates would then be smaller than with exogenous wages.
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wage elasticities, but we can already anticipate the qualitative results. The left panel
of Figure 1 above clearly shows that the covariance between incomes and the cross-
wage elasticities is positive for low values of y∗ (dotted curve) and negative for large
values of y∗ (dashed-dotted curve). Therefore, if the marginal tax rates are ini-
tially increasing with income, the covariance term Cov(T ′ (y) ; y Γ¯ (y, y∗)) decreases
with y∗. Consequently, the same qualitative insight as in the CES model holds: the
general-equilibrium contribution to government revenue of a tax increase at income
y∗ increases with y∗. In other words, both terms in the curly brackets of formula (18)
push in the same direction.
Conclusion: progressivity and trickle-down. The previous discussion implies
that, starting from a progressive tax schedule, the standard partial-equilibrium for-
mula (16) underestimates the tax revenue (or, equivalently, Rawlsian social welfare)
gains from raising the marginal tax rates at the top and lowering them at the bot-
tom. In other words, the standard model underestimates the benefits of raising the
progressivity of the tax code.24 Conversely, starting from a regressive tax schedule,
the partial-equilibrium formula overestimates the gains (or underestimates the losses)
from increasing marginal tax rates at the top. Thus, contrary to conventional wis-
dom that is based on optimal tax theory (see, e.g., Stiglitz (1982); Rothschild and
Scheuer (2013) and Section 5 below), the trickle-down forces caused by the endogene-
ity of wages may either raise or lower the benefits of raising high-income tax rates,
depending on the shape of marginal tax rates in the initial tax system. In particular,
since the tax code in the U.S. is progressive (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2017)), the benefits of raising further its progressivity (i.e., of increasing the marginal
tax rates on high incomes) are larger than a model with fixed wages would predict.
We therefore conclude that one should be cautious, in practice, when applying the
insights of the theory of optimal taxation in general equilibrium to partial reforms of
a suboptimal tax code.
24In Appendix D, we extend Corollary 4 to the case where agents' utility functions have income
effects. This adds a term that dampens the result, but does not overturn it quantitatively for
empirically reasonable values of the parameters.
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4 Numerical simulations
We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy and evaluate quantitatively the effects of
elementary tax reforms on government revenue using formula (18). First, in Section
4.1, we assume that the production function is CES and show that the general-
equilibrium effects are sizeable. Second, in Section 4.2, we combine our calibration
with that of Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015) to evaluate our formulas in the environ-
ment with endogenous skill-to-task assignment. Details and robustness checks are
provided in Appendix E.
4.1 Main specification
We assume that the disutility of labor v (l) is isoelastic with parameter e = 0.33
(Chetty (2012)) and that the U.S. tax schedule is CRP with parameters p = 0.151
and τ = −3 (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017)). To match the U.S. yearly
earnings distribution, we assume that fY (·) is log-normal with mean 10 and variance
0.95 up to income y = $150, 000, above which we append a Pareto distribution with
a tail parameter that decreases from Π ≈ 2.5 at y = $150, 000 to Π = 1.5 for y ≥
$350, 000 (Diamond and Saez (2011)). We follow the approach of Saez (2001) to infer
the distribution of wages from the observed earnings distribution and the individual
first-order conditions (1). We extend this method to calibrate the production function:
assuming a CES technology, choosing an elasticity of substitution σ is enough to pin
down all the remaining parameters.
We choose an elasticity of substitution σ ∈ {0.6 ; 3.1}. The value σ = 0.6 is taken
from Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) who study the impact of immigration
along the U.K. wage distribution and, as in our framework, group workers according to
their position in the wage distribution.25 The value σ = 3.1 is taken from Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2017), who structurally estimate this CES parameter for
the U.S. by targeting cross-sectional moments of the joint equilibrium distribution of
wages, hours, and consumption.26
25This literature is a useful benchmark because it studies the impact on relative wages of ex-
ogenous labor supply shocks of certain skills, which is exactly the channel we want to analyze in
our tax setting (except that for us the labor supply shocks are caused by tax reforms rather than
immigration inflows).
26There is no clear consensus in the empirical literature on how responsive relative wages are to
changes in labor supply, and therefore on the appropriate value of σ, see, e.g., the debate on the
impact of immigration on wages (Peri and Yasenov (2019); Borjas (2017)). Our two values are on
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Our results for the CES specification are illustrated in Figure 2. We plot the
impact on government revenue of elementary tax reforms at each income level in the
model with exogenous wages (solid curve, equation (16)) and in general equilibrium
(dashed curve, equation (19)), as a function of the income y(θ) at which the marginal
tax rate is perturbed. A value of 0.7, say, at a given income y(θ), means that for each
additional dollar of tax revenue mechanically levied by the tax reform at y(θ), the
government effectively gains 70 cents, while 30 cents are lost through the behavioral
responses of individuals  that is, the marginal excess burden of this tax reform is 30
percent.
Consider first the solid curve: it has a U-shaped pattern which reflects the shape
of the hazard ratio y
∗fY (y∗)
1−FY (y∗) in (16). This is a well-known finding in the literature
(Diamond (1998); Saez (2001)). The difference between the dashed and solid curves
captures the additional revenue effect due to the endogeneity of wages. In line with
our analytical result of formula (19), we observe that this difference is positive for
intermediate and high incomes (starting from about $77,000, where the marginal tax
rate equals its income-weighted average). Raising the marginal tax rates for these
income levels is more desirable, in terms of government revenue, when the general
equilibrium effects are taken into account, while the opposite holds for low income
levels. The magnitude of the difference is substantial: the marginal excess burden
from increasing the marginal tax rate at $200,000 is equal to 0.22 cents per dollar
if σ = 0.6 and 0.30 cents per dollar if σ = 3.1, instead of 0.34 if σ = ∞. That is,
the excess burden is reduced by 35 percent if σ = 0.6 and 12 percent if σ = 3.1 due
to the general equilibrium effects. Hence, the standard model with exogenous wages
significantly underestimates the revenue gains from increasing the progressivity of the
tax code.
4.2 Endogenous assignment
We now investigate the effects of tax reforms on government revenue in the endogenous
assignment economy described in Section 1.3. We assume a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function over tasks and set the values of its technological parameters using the
estimates of Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015). As we describe in the Appendix, our
calibration extends theirs to allow for an unbounded distribution of incomes with a
Pareto tail, which is crucial to obtain U-shaped effects of tax reforms on government
the lower and higher sides of the typical empirical estimates.
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Figure 2: Revenue effects of elementary tax reforms at each income y∗ (formula (17)). Solid
curves: exogenous wages. Dashed curves: CES technology with σ = 0.6 (left panel) and σ = 3.1
(right panel).
revenue. This calibration allows us to compute the cross-wage elasticities, already
described in Section 1.3, that enter our tax incidence formula (18). We then com-
pare the effects of tax reforms on government revenue in this environment with those
obtained in Section 4.1 assuming a CES technology with fixed assignment.
Effects of tax reforms on government revenue. Figure 3 shows the government
revenue impact of elementary tax reforms at each income level. In both panels of
Figure 3, the solid curve gives the revenue effects (16) in the model with exogenous
wages. The dashed curve is for the model with endogenous and costless reassignment
and the dashed-dotted curve is for the model with fixed assignment as in Section 4.1.
We consider two calibrations for the latter model. First, in the left panel we assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function (σ = 1), i.e., we shut down the reassignment
channel in the calibration of Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015). Second, more relevant for
our purposes, in the right panel we assume a CES production function with σ = 3.1,
following the direct estimation of a technology over labor supplies of different skills
by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017).
Qualitatively, as shown analytically in Section 3.2, the fixed and endogenous as-
signment models deliver similar policy implications: the government revenue gains
are higher (resp., lower) due to the endogeneity of wages if the marginal tax rates
are raised on high (resp., low) incomes. Quantitatively, if we assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function in the model with fixed assignment (σ = 1), we find that the
endogenous reassignment of workers into new tasks mitigates the magnitude of the
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Figure 3: Revenue effects of elementary tax reforms at each income y∗ (formula (17)) using the
calibration of Ales et al. (2015). Solid curves: exogenous wages. Dashed curves: Cobb-Douglas
technology over tasks with endogenous costless reassignment of skills to tasks. Dotted curve: CES
technology with fixed assignment and σ = 1 (left panel) or σ = 3.1 (right panel).
general-equilibrium effects on revenue:27 while still significant, they are around 30
percent of those obtained with fixed assignment if the elementary tax reform is con-
ducted at $200,000. However, if we use a value of σ that is directly estimated for
a CES production function over skills (σ = 3.1), we obtain that the implications of
tax reforms for government revenue are quantitatively closer: the effect is now 70%
of that obtained with fixed assignment.
5 Optimal taxation
In this section we show that our tax incidence analysis delivers a characterization of
the optimal (i.e., social welfare-maximizing) tax schedule as a by-product. We first
formally introduce the social welfare criterion. We then present simple extensions of
two seminal formulas to the general equilibrium environment: the optimal marginal
tax rate formula of Diamond (1998) and the optimal top tax rate formula of Saez
(2001).28 The proofs and technical details are relegated to Appendix F.
27Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) derive this result analytically in their model.
28Importantly, contrary to Saez (2001), this formula indeed characterizes the optimal top tax rate
only if the whole tax schedule is set optimally. Our analysis of Section 3.2 shows that it is no longer
valid if the initial tax schedule is suboptimal. We return to this point in Section 5.4 below.
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5.1 Welfare function and welfare weights
The government evaluates social welfare by means of a concave function G : R →
R. Letting λ denote the marginal value of public funds, we define social welfare in
monetary units by
G = 1
λ
ˆ
Θ
G (U (θ)) f (θ) dθ.
The optimal tax schedule maximizes social welfare G subject to the constraint that
government revenue R is non-negative.
We denote by g (θ), or equivalently g (y (θ)), the marginal social welfare weight
associated with individuals of type θ:
g (θ) =
1
λ
G′ (U (θ)) . (20)
The weight g (θ) is the social value of giving one additional unit of consumption to
individuals with type θ, relative to distributing it uniformly to the whole population.
5.2 Optimal tax schedule
The effects of arbitrary tax reforms Tˆ on social welfare are easily obtained by adding
the effects on government revenue (Section 3.2) to those on individual utilities (Section
2.2), weighing the latter by the marginal social welfare weights g (θ). A characteriza-
tion of the optimum tax schedule can then be obtained by imposing that the welfare
effects of any tax reform Tˆ of the initial tax schedule T are equal to zero. In this
section, we focus on the special case of a CES production function. This implies
a parsimonious generalization of the result of Stiglitz (1982) derived in a two-skill
environment and the formula of Diamond (1998) derived for exogenous wages.
Proposition 3. Assume that the production function is CES with elasticity of sub-
stitution σ > 0. Then the optimal marginal tax rate at income y∗ satisfies
T ′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗) =
(
1
εSr (y
∗)
+
1
εDr (y
∗)
)
(1− g¯ (y∗)) 1− FY (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
+
g (y∗)− 1
σ
, (21)
where εDr (y
∗) = σ and g¯ (y∗) ≡ E[g (y) |y ≥ y∗] is the average marginal social welfare
weight above income y∗.
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The first term on the right hand side of (21) shows that, analogous to the op-
timal tax formula obtained in the model with exogenous wages (Diamond (1998),
Saez (2001)), the marginal tax rate at income y∗ is decreasing in the average so-
cial marginal welfare weight g¯ (y∗), and increasing in the hazard rate of the income
distribution 1−FY (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
. However, the standard inverse elasticity rule is modified: the
relevant parameter is now the sum of the inverse elasticity of labor supply and the
inverse elasticity of labor demand. Since εDw (y
∗) = σ > 0, this novel force tends to
raise optimal marginal tax rates. Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at y∗
leads these agents to lower their labor supply, which raises their own wage and thus
mitigates their behavioral response.
The second term, (g (y∗)− 1) /σ captures the fact that the wage and welfare of
agents θ∗ increase in response to a higher marginal tax rate T ′ (y∗), at the expense of
all the other individuals whose wages and welfare decrease (see Section 2.2). Suppose
that the government values the welfare of individuals θ∗ less than average, i.e., g (y∗) <
1.29 This negative externality induced by the behavior of θ∗ implies that the cost of
raising the marginal tax rate at y∗ is higher than in partial equilibrium, and tends to
lower the optimal tax rate. Conversely, the government gains by raising the optimal
tax rates of individuals y∗ whose welfare is valued more than average, i.e., g (y∗) > 1.
This induces these agents to work less and earn a higher wage, which makes them
strictly better off, at the expense of the other individuals in the economy, whose
wage decreases. Therefore, this term creates a force for higher marginal tax rates at
the bottom and lower marginal tax rates at the top if the government has a strictly
concave social objective.30
5.3 Optimal top tax rate
We now derive the implications for the asymptotic optimal marginal tax rate. Let
Π > 1 denote the Pareto coefficient of the tail of the income distribution, that is,
1 − FY (y) ∼ c y−Π as y → ∞ for some constant c. We show that if the production
function is CES and the top marginal tax rate that applies to these incomes is con-
stant, then the tail of the income distribution has the same Pareto coefficient at the
optimum as in the current data, even though the wage distribution is endogenous.
29Note that the average social marginal welfare weight in the economy is equal to 1.
30This result, as well as that of Corollary 5 below, echo those of Rothschild and Scheuer (2013)
in the Roy model.
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In other words, shifting up or down the top tax rate modifies wages, but the tail
parameter Π of the income distribution stays constant. This leads to the following
corollary.
Corollary 5. Assume that the production function is CES with parameter σ > 0,
that the disutility of labor is isoelastic with parameter e, and that incomes are Pareto
distributed at the tail with coefficient Π > 1. Assume moreover that the social marginal
welfare weights at the top converge to a constant g¯. Then the top rate of the optimal
tax schedule is given by
τ ∗ =
1− g¯
1− g¯ + Π εr ζ , with εr =
e
1 + e
σ
and ζ =
1
1− Π εr
σ
. (22)
In particular, τ ∗ is strictly smaller than the optimal top tax rate in the model with
exogenous wages (σ =∞).
Formula (22) generalizes the familiar top tax rate result of Saez (2001) (in which
εr = ε
S
r and ζ = 1) to a CES production function. There is one new parameter, the
elasticity of substitution between skills in production σ, that is no longer restricted to
being infinite. This proposition implies a strictly lower top marginal tax rate than if
wages were exogenous. Immediate calculations of the optimal top tax rate illustrate
this formula.31 Suppose that g¯ = 0, Π = 2, e = 0.5, and σ = 1.5.32 We immediately
obtain that the optimal tax rate on top incomes is equal to τ ∗
ex
= 50 percent in the
model with exogenous wages, and falls to τ ∗ = 40 percent once the general equilibrium
effects are taken into account. Suppose instead that Π = 1.5 and e = 0.33, then we
get τ ∗
ex
= 66 percent and τ ∗ = 64 percent. In this case the trickle-down forces barely
affect the optimum tax rate quantitatively.
5.4 Numerical simulations
We now provide a quantitative exploration of the optimum tax schedule (21). The left
panel of Figure 4 plots the optimal marginal tax rates for a Rawlsian planner for two
different values of the elasticity of substitution. It compares them to the marginal tax
rates that a planner would set by applying the standard formula of Diamond (1998),
31Again, it is important to keep in mind that equation (22) holds only if the whole tax schedule
is set optimally.
32These values are meant to be only illustrative but they are in the range of those estimated in
the empirical literature. See the calibration in Section 4.
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using the same data to calibrate the model and making the same assumptions about
the utility function, but assuming that the wage distribution is exogenous. The scale
on the horizontal axis is measured in income; e.g., the value of the optimal marginal
tax rate at the $100,000 mark is that of a type θ who earns y (θ) = $100, 000 in the
calibration to the U.S data  the income that this agent would earn in the optimal
allocation would be different. The exogenous-wage optimum is U-shaped, reflecting
the shape of the hazard rate of the wage distribution. When general equilibrium
effects are taken into account, the optimal top tax rate is reduced (Corollary 5) and
the U-shape is more pronounced.
To understand these results, the right panel of Figure 4 plots the shape of the
general-equilibrium correction to optimal tax rates. We do so by applying our in-
cidence formula (17) using the exogenous-wage optimum as our initial tax schedule
(i.e., the dotted curve in the left panel of Figure 4). The red line gives the govern-
ment revenue impact of elementary tax reforms under the (erroneous) assumption
that wages are exogenous. In this scenario, the effect would be uniformly equal to
zero by construction. The dashed curve gives the correct effect, taking into account
the endogenous adjustment of wages. In this case, the gains from raising the marginal
tax rates are themselves U-shaped and, except at the very bottom of the income dis-
tribution, negative. Therefore, when the low-income marginal tax rates are high (as
in the exogenous-wage optimum) rather than low (as in the CRP tax code), the gen-
eral equilibrium forces call for higher marginal tax rates on low incomes, and lower
tax rates on intermediate and high incomes.
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Figure 4: Left panel: Optimal marginal tax rates. Dotted curve: exogenous wages; Bold: CES
technology with σ = 3.1; Dashed-dotted: σ = 0.6. Right panel: Revenue effects of elementary
reforms (formula (17)) around the exogenous-wage optimum. Bold line: exogenous wages; Dashed:
CES technology with σ = 3.1.
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Discussion. These observations allow us to reconcile the insights of Section 3.2
(according to which the endogeneity of wages raises the benefits of increasing the
marginal tax rates on high incomes) and those of Section 5.3 (according to which
the optimal top tax rate is lower than in partial equilibrium). The reason for this
discrepancy is that the optimum tax code is U-shaped and therefore has a form of
regressivity  relatively high marginal tax rates at the bottom and relatively low
marginal tax rates at the top. Instead, in Section 3.2, we analyzed partial reforms
of a suboptimal tax code, with low marginal tax rates at the bottom and high rates
at the top. In the latter environment, even though the overall gains of reforming the
tax code always point towards the optimal U-shaped schedule, the general-equilibrium
contribution to these overall gains tends to mitigate the partial-equilibrium benefits if
the tax system being reformed is progressive. The converse is true if the tax schedule
being reformed is regressive. Intuitively, since the fraction of the endogenous wage
changes that accrues to the government is proportional to the marginal tax rate, the
general-equilibrium effects of tax reforms on government revenue inherit the shape
of the initial tax schedule. Therefore, the key take-away is that insights about the
optimum tax schedule may actually be reversed when considering partial reforms of
the current, suboptimal tax code.
6 Conclusion
We developed a variational approach for the study of nonlinear tax reforms in general
equilibrium. Our methodology consisted of using the tools of the theory of integral
equations to characterize: (i) the incidence of reforming a given tax schedule, e.g. the
current U.S. tax code, and (ii) the optimal tax schedule. The formulas we derived
are expressed in terms of sufficient statistics. The direct empirical estimation of these
cross-wage elasticities is an important avenue for future research.
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Online Appendix for Nonlinear Tax Incidence and
Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium
Dominik Sachs, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin
A Proofs of Section 1
A.1 Reduced-form production function
Labor supply elasticities. The first-order condition (1) can be rewritten as v′ (l (θ)) = r (θ)w (θ),
where r (θ) = 1−T ′ (w (θ) l (θ)) is the retention rate of agent θ. Ignoring the endogeneity of r (θ) and
applying the implicit function theorem (IFT) to this equation gives the labor supply elasticity along
the linear budget constraint, e (θ)= r(θ)l(θ)
∂l(θ)
∂r(θ) =
v′(l(θ))
l(θ)v′′(l(θ)) . Applying the IFT again but accounting
for the endogeneity of T ′ (w (θ) l (θ)) to labor supply  i.e., taking a first-order Taylor expansion of
the perturbed first-order condition
v′ (l (θ) + δl (θ)) = [1− T ′ (w (θ) (l (θ) + δl (θ)))− δr (θ)]w (θ)
and solving for δl (θ)  leads to the expression (7) for the labor supply elasticity along the nonlinear
budget constraint εSr (θ). The elasticity with respect to the wage, ε
S
w (θ), can be derived analogously.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The first-order condition (1) has a unique solution l (θ). For all θ ∈ Θ, we
have |p (y (θ)) e (θ)| < 1 and ∣∣εSw (θ) /εDw (θ)∣∣ < 1, where the labor supply and demand elasticities
e (θ) , εSw (θ) , ε
D
w (θ) are defined in Section 1.2.
As in the partial-equilibrium environment with exogenous wages, the uniqueness of the solution to
the individual first-order condition allows us to apply the IFT. The condition |p (y (θ)) e (θ)| < 1
ensures that the elasticities εSr (θ) , ε
S
w (θ) are well-defined. Specifically, the condition p (y (θ)) e (θ) >
−1 ensures that the second-order condition of the individual problem is satisfied. The condition
p (y (θ)) e (θ) < 1 ensures the convergence of the labor supply responses towards the fixed point
that characterizes the elasticities along the nonlinear budget constraint. Finally, the condition∣∣εSw (θ) /εDw (θ)∣∣ < 1 ensures that the equilibrium labor elasticities εw (θ) introduced in Lemma 1 are
well defined.
One-to-one map between skills, wages, and incomes. Without loss of generality, we order
skills θ so that wages w (θ) are strictly increasing in θ in the initial equilibrium. Next, note that the
individual first-order condition (1) implies that the elasticity of income with respect to the wage is
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given by w(θ)y(w(θ))y
′(w (θ)) = 1 + εSw (θ), so that incomes are strictly increasing in wages if and only if
εSw (θ) > −1, or equivalently e (θ) > −1, which is equivalent to the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Hence,
imposing the Spence-Mirrlees condition implies that there is a one-to-one map between incomes y (θ)
and skills θ .
Importantly, note that for our analysis we do not need to impose that this monotone mapping
is preserved after the tax reform is implemented because the reforms we consider are marginal.
Nevertheless, we now show that when the production function is CES, this ordering remains satisfied
after any, possibly non-local, tax reform. This is useful because it implies that the ordering of types
does not change between the wage distribution calibrated using current data and the one implied by
the optimal tax schedule. Without loss of generality we assume that types are uniformly distributed
on the unit interval Θ = [0, 1], so that f (θ) = 1 for all θ. For a CES production function, we have
w′ (θ)
w (θ)
=
a′ (θ)
a (θ)
− 1
σ
l′ (θ)
l (θ)
=
a′ (θ)
a (θ)
− ε
S
w (θ)
σ
w′ (θ)
w (θ)
.
Assumption 1 above implies 1 + εSw(θ)/σ > 0, so that the sign of w
′(θ) is the same as that of a′(θ)
independently of the tax system.
Lemma 2 (Euler's homogeneous function theorem). The following relationship between the
own-wage elasticity and the structural cross-wage elasticities is satisfied for all y∗:
− 1
εDw (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗) +
ˆ
R+
γ(y, y∗)yfY (y) dy = 0, (23)
where we define γ (y (θ) , y (θ′)) ≡ (y′ (θ′))−1 γ (θ, θ′). Equivalently, this can be expressed in terms of
the resolvent cross-wage elasticities:
− 1
εDw (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗) +
ˆ
R+
Γ (y, y∗)
1 + εSw (y) /ε
D
w (y)
yfY (y) dy = 0. (24)
Proof of Lemma 2. Constant returns to scale imply 1
εDw (θ
′)y (θ
′) f (θ′) =
´
Θ
γ (θ, θ′) y (θ) dF (θ)
for all θ′. Changing variables from types θ to incomes y (θ) leads to (23). Now this equation implies
that
ˆ
Θ
wˆ (θ)
w (θ)
y (θ) f (θ) dθ =
ˆ
Θ
[
− 1
εDw (θ)
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
+
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ, θ′)
lˆ (θ′)
l (θ′)
dθ′
]
y (θ) f (θ) dθ
=−
ˆ
Θ
[
1
εDw (θ)
y (θ) f (θ) +
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ′, θ) y (θ′) f (θ′) dθ′
]
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
dθ = 0.
We can use equation (13) to substitute for wˆ(θ)w(θ) in the previous equality, and then equation (9)
to substitute for lˆ(θ)l(θ) . Applying the formula to the elementary tax reform Tˆ
′ (y) = δ (y − y∗) and
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changing variables from skills to incomes leads to:
0 =
ˆ
R+
1
εSw (y)
[
εSr (y)
δ (y − y∗)
1− T ′ (y) −
(
εr (y)
δ (y − y∗)
1− T ′ (y) + εw (y)
Γ (y, y∗) εr (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
)]
yf (y) dy.
This easily leads to formula (24).
Formulas for CES technology. Wages are w (θ) = a (θ) (L (θ))−
1
σ [
´
Θ
a (x) (L (x))
σ−1
σ dx]
1
σ−1 , so
that the cross-wage and own-wage elasticities are given by
γ (θ, θ′) =
1
σ
a (θ′) (L (θ′))
σ−1
σ
´
Θ
a (x) (L (x))
σ−1
σ dx
and
1
εDw (θ)
=
1
σ
. (25)
This implies in particular, for all θ ∈ Θ, ´
Θ
γ (θ, θ′) dθ′ = 1σ . Applying Euler's homogeneous function
theorem to rewrite expression (25) for γ (θ, θ′) and changing variables leads to:
γ (y, y′) =
1
σ
y′fY (y′)´
R+ xfY (x) dx
. (26)
Assume in addition that the disutility of labor is isoelastic with parameter e and that the initial
tax schedule is CRP with parameter p. The labor supply elasticities (7) and the equilibrium labor
elasticities (introduced in Lemma 1) are then all constant and given by εSr (y) =
e
1+pe , ε
S
w (y) =
(1−p)e
1+pe , εr (y) =
e
1+pe+(1−p) eσ , εw (y) =
(1−p)e
1+pe+(1−p) eσ .
Relationship with Scheuer and Werning (2016, 2017). These papers analyze a general equi-
librium extension of Mirrlees (1971) and prove a neutrality result: in their model, the optimal tax
formula is the same as in partial equilibrium, even though they consider a more general production
function than Mirrlees (1971).33 The key modeling difference between our framework and theirs
is the following. In theirs, all the agents produce the same input with different productivities θ.
Denoting by η (θ) = θl (θ) the agent's production of that input (i.e., the efficiency units of labor),
the aggregate production function then maps the distribution of η into output. In equilibrium, a
nonlinear price (earnings) schedule p (·) emerges such that an agent who produces η units earns
income p (η), irrespective of the underlying productivity θ. Hence, when an (atomistic) individual
θ provides more effort l (θ), income moves along the non-linear schedule l 7→ p (θ × l); e.g., in their
superstars model with a convex equilibrium earnings schedule, income increases faster than linearly.
By contrast, in our framework, different values of θ index different inputs in the aggregate production
function; for each of these inputs, there is one specific price (wage) w (θ), and hence a linear earnings
schedule l 7→ w (θ)× l. Therefore, when an individual θ provides more effort l (θ), income increases
linearly, as the wage remains constant (since the sector θ doesn't change). In their framework,
33The policy implications can nevertheless be different. For instance, in Scheuer and Werning
(2017), the relevant earnings elasticity in the formula written in terms of the observed income
distribution is higher due to the superstar effects.
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Scheuer and Werning show that the general equilibrium effects exactly cancel out at the optimum
tax schedule, even though they would of course be non-zero in the characterization of the incidence
effects of tax reforms around a suboptimal tax code. In our framework, as in those of Stiglitz (1982);
Rothschild and Scheuer (2014); Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015), these general equilibrium forces are
also present at the optimum.34
A.2 Microfoundation of the production function
Our microfoundation of the production function Y = F({L (θ)}θ∈Θ) extends the Costinot and Vogel
(2010) model of endogenous assignment of skills to tasks to incorporate endogenous labor supply
choices by agents and nonlinear labor income taxes. There is a continuum of mass one of agents
indexed by their skill θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ¯] and a continuum of tasks (e.g., manual, routine, abstract, etc.)
indexed by their skill intensity, ψ ∈ Ψ = [ψ, ψ¯]. Let A (θ, ψ) be the product of a unit of labor of skill
θ employed in task ψ. We assume that high-skill workers have a comparative advantage in tasks with
high skill intensity, i.e., A (θ, ψ) is strictly log-supermodular: A (θ′, ψ′)A (θ, ψ) > A (θ, ψ′)A (θ′, ψ)
for all θ′ > θ and ψ′ > ψ.
Individuals. Agents with skill θ earn wage w (θ) which they take as given. Labor supply satisfies
(1). We denote by c (θ) the agent's consumption of the final good.
Final good firm. The final good Y is produced using as inputs the output Y (ψ) of each task
ψ ∈ Ψ with the following CES production function:
Y =
{ˆ ψ¯
ψ
B (ψ) [Y (ψ)]
σ−1
σ dψ
} σ
σ−1
.
The final good firm chooses the quantities of inputs Y (ψ) of each type ψ to maximize its profit
Y − ´
Ψ
p (ψ)Y (ψ) dψ, where p (ψ) is the price of task ψ which the firm takes as given. The first-
order conditions read: ∀ψ ∈ Ψ,
Y (ψ) = [p (ψ)]−σ[B (ψ)]σY. (27)
Intermediate good firms. The output of task ψ is produced linearly by intermediate firms that
hire the labor L (θ | ψ) of skills θ ∈ Θ that they hire, so that
Y (ψ) =
ˆ
Θ
A (θ, ψ)L (θ | ψ) dθ.
34Another perspective to understand the distinction between our two papers is as a difference in
the utility function. In Scheuer-Werning, individuals can pick one element within the set of effective
labor H = R∗+. In our setting, each element of H corresponds to one type θ, different types of
individuals supply different kinds of effective labor and choose the quantity with which they supply
this variety. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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The intermediate good firm of type ψ chooses its demand for labor L (θ) of each skill θ to maximize
its profit p (ψ)Y (ψ)− ´
Θ
w (θ)L (θ | ψ) dθ taking the wage w (θ) as given. The first-order condition
implies that this firm is willing to hire any quantity of labor that is supplied by the workers of type
θ as long as their wage is given by
w (θ) = p (ψ)A (θ, ψ) , if L (θ | ψ) > 0. (28)
Moreover, the wage of any skill θ that is not employed in task ψ must satisfy
w (θ) ≥ p (ψ)A (θ, ψ) , if L (θ | ψ) = 0. (29)
Market clearing. We first impose that the market for the final good market clears. This condition
reads Y =
´
Θ
c (θ) f (θ) dθ + R, where f the density of skills θ ∈ Θ in the population and R ≡´
Θ
T (w (θ) l (θ)) f (θ) dθ is the government revenue which is used to buy the final good. Using the
agents' and the government budget constraints, this can be rewritten as:
Y =
ˆ
Θ
w (θ) l (θ) f (θ) dθ. (30)
Second, we impose that the market for each intermediate good ψ ∈ Ψ clears. For simplicity, we
assume at the outset that there is a one-to-one matching function M : Θ → Ψ between skills
and tasks  we show below that it is indeed the case in equilibrium. Letting ψ = M (θ) be the
task assigned to skill θ, we must then have
´M(θ)
ψ
Y (ψ) dψ =
´ θ
θ
A (θ′,M (θ′))L (θ′ |M (θ′)) dθ′, or
simply Y (ψ) dψ = A (θ,M (θ))L (θ |M (θ)) dθ. This implies: ∀θ ∈ Θ,
Y (M (θ))M ′ (θ) = A (θ,M (θ))L (θ |M (θ)) . (31)
Formally, this condition is obtained by substituting for L (θ | ψ) = δ{ψ=M(θ)} in the equation Y (ψ) =´
Θ
A (θ, ψ)L (θ | ψ) dθ, where δ is the dirac delta function, and changing variables from skills to
tasks to compute the integral. Third, we impose that the market for labor of each skill θ ∈ Θ clears:
∀θ ∈ Θ,
l (θ) f (θ) = L (θ |M (θ)) . (32)
Competitive equilibrium. Given a tax function T : R+ → R, an equilibrium consists of a sched-
ule of labor supplies {l (θ)}θ∈Θ, labor demands {L (θ | ψ)}θ∈Θ,ψ∈Ψ, intermediate goods {Y (ψ)}ψ∈Ψ,
final good Y , wages {w (θ)}θ∈Θ, prices {p (ψ)}ψ∈Ψ, and a matching function M : Θ→ Ψ such that
equations (1), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32) hold.
Equilibrium assignment. The first part of the analysis consists of proving the existence of the
continuous and strictly increasing one-to-one matching function M : Θ → Ψ with M(θ) = ψ and
M(θ¯) = ψ¯. That is, there is positive assortative matching. The proof is identical to that in Costinot
and Vogel (2010). The second part of the analysis consists of characterizing the matching function
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and the wage schedule. We find
M ′ (θ) =
A (θ,M (θ)) l (θ) f (θ)
[p (M (θ))]
−σ
[B (M (θ))]
σ
Y
(33)
with M(θ) = ψ and M(θ¯) = ψ¯, and where Y is given by (30) and p (M (θ)) is given by (28).
w′ (θ)
w (θ)
=
A′1 (θ,M (θ))
A (θ,M (θ))
. (34)
Equation (33), which characterizes the equilibrium matching as the solution to a nonlinear differential
equation, is a direct consequence of the market clearing equation (31), in which we use (27) to
substitute for Y (M (θ)). Equation (34), which characterizes the equilibrium wage schedule, is a
consequence of the firms' profit maximization conditions (28) and follows the same steps as Costinot
and Vogel (2010).
Reduced form production function. Equilibrium assignment of skills to tasks is endogenous
to taxes. We denote by M (· | T ) : Θ → Ψ the matching function with T as an explicit argument.
The main result, for our purposes, is that the tax schedule T affects the equilibrium assignment only
through its effect on agents' labor supply choices L ≡ {l (θ) f (θ)}θ∈Θ. Indeed, note that none of
the equations (27)-(32), which define the equilibrium for given labor supply levels {l (θ)}θ∈Θ, depend
directly on T . This implies that if two distinct tax schedules lead to the same equilibrium labor
supply choices L , they will also lead to the same assignment of skills to tasks M . Therefore, the
matching function M (· | T ) can be rewritten as M (· | L ). This result implies that the model can
be summarized by a reduced-form production function F (L ) over the labor supplies of different
skills in the population. To see this, note that the production function (over tasks) of the final good
can be written as
Y =
{ˆ ψ¯
ψ
B (ψ) [Y (ψ)]
σ−1
σ dψ
} σ
σ−1
=
{ˆ θ¯
θ
B (M (θ)) [Y (M (θ))]
σ−1
σ M ′ (θ) dθ
} σ
σ−1
=
{ˆ θ¯
θ
a (θ,M) [l (θ) f (θ)]
σ−1
σ dθ
} σ
σ−1
, (35)
where a (θ,M) ≡ B (M (θ)) [A (θ,M (θ))]σ−1σ [M ′ (θ)] 1σ .35 The second equality follows from a change
of variables from tasks to skills using the one-to-one mapM between the two variables, and the third
equality uses the market clearing conditions (31) and (32) to substitute for Y (M (θ)). Equation
(35) defines a production function over skills θ ∈ Θ. This production function inherits the CES
structure of the original production function, except that the technological coefficients a (θ,M) are
now endogenous to taxes since they depend on the matching function M . We can write (35) as a
35Note that, of course, this reduced-form production function is consistent with the wage schedule
derived above. We find that w (θ) = B (M (θ))A (θ,M (θ)) [ YY (M(θ)) ]
1/σ by combining (28) and (27).
Differentiating the reduced-form production function (35) with respect to l (θ) f (θ) and using (31)
leads to the same expression.
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function F˜({l (θ) f (θ)}θ∈Θ ,M) ≡ F˜ (L ,M). Now, using the result proved above that the function
M ≡ M (· | L ) depends on taxes only through the equilibrium labor supplies L , we finally obtain
the following reduced form production function:
Y = F (L ) . (36)
Using the reduced-form production function (36), all of the results we have derived go through.
We can still define wages and the cross-wage elasticities as w (θ) = ∂F(L )∂[l(θ)f(θ)] and γ (θ, θ
′) ≡
∂ lnw(θ)
∂ ln[l(θ′)f(θ′)] . These cross-wage elasticities are defined as the impact of an exogenous shock to the
supply of labor of type θ′ (e.g., an immigration inflow) on the wage of type θ, keeping everyone's
labor supply constant otherwise, but allowing for the endogenous re-assignment of skills to tasks
following this exogenous shock. Indeed, the reduced-form production function F accounts for the
dependence of the matching function on agents' labor supplies.
B Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1 and Corollary 2. Denote the perturbed tax function by T˜ (y) = T (y) +
µTˆ (y) and by lˆ (θ) the Gateaux derivative of the labor supply of type θ in response to this pertur-
bation. The labor supply response of type θ is given by the solution to the perturbed first-order
condition
0 =v′
(
l (θ) + µlˆ (θ)
)
−
{
1− T ′
[
w˜ (θ)×
(
l (θ) + µlˆ (θ)
)]
− µTˆ ′
[
w˜ (θ)×
(
l (θ) + µlˆ (θ)
)]}
w˜ (θ) , (37)
where w˜ (θ) is the perturbed wage schedule, which satisfies
w˜ (θ)− w (θ)
µ
=
1
µ
{
F ′θ({(l (θ′) + µlˆ (θ′))f (θ′)}θ′∈Θ)−F ′θ({l (θ′) f (θ′)}θ′∈Θ)
}
=
µ→0
F ′θ
ˆ
Θ
L (θ′)F ′′θ,θ′
F ′θ
lˆ (θ′)
l (θ′)
dθ′ = w (θ)
[
− 1
εDw (θ)
lˆ (θ)
l (θ)
+
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ, θ′)
lˆ (θ′)
l (θ′)
dθ′
]
. (38)
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the perturbed first-order conditions (37) around the baseline
allocation, using (38) to substitute for w˜ (θ)− w (θ), and solving for lˆ (θ) yields1 + 1− T ′ (y (θ))− y (θ)T ′′ (y (θ))1− T ′ (y (θ)) + v′(l(θ))l(θ)v′′(l(θ))y (θ)T ′′ (y (θ))
v′ (l (θ))
l (θ) v′′ (l (θ))
1
εDw (θ)
 lˆ (θ)l (θ)
=
1− T ′ (y (θ))− y (θ)T ′′ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) + v′(l(θ))l(θ)v′′(l(θ))y (θ)T ′′ (y (θ))
v′ (l (θ))
l (θ) v′′ (l (θ))
ˆ
Θ
γ (θ, θ′)
lˆ (θ′)
l (θ′)
dθ′
− 1
1− T ′ (y (θ)) + v′(l(θ))l(θ)v′′(l(θ))y (θ)T ′′ (y (θ))
v′ (l (θ))
l (θ) v′′ (l (θ))
Tˆ ′ (y (θ)) ,
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which leads to equation (8). Equation (13) follows easily from (38). Substituting into (8) leads to
formula (13). Equation (14) follows by taking the Gateaux derivative of the agent's indirect utility
and using the first order condition (1).
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (8) is a Fredholm integral equation of the second kind. Assume
that the condition
´
Θ2
|εw (θ) γ (θ, θ′)|2 dθdθ′ < 1 holds. Theorem 2.3.1 in Zemyan (2012) gives the
unique solution (9) to this equation.
Proof of equation (12). Suppose that the cross-wage elasticities are multiplicatively separable,
i.e., of the form γ (θ, θ′) = γ1 (θ) γ2 (θ′). Theorem 1.3.1 in Zemyan (2012) (or 4.9.1 in Polyanin and
Manzhirov (2008)) gives the solution to the integral equation (9). If the production function is CES,
we have γ1 (θ) = 1 and γ2 (θ) =
1
σEyy (θ) fY (y (θ)) y
′ (θ). A change of variables from skills θ to
incomes y (θ) easily leads to (12). Note that this solution is well defined if 1σEyE [yεw (y)] < 1.
Sufficient conditions ensuring the convergence of the resolvent (10). Suppose that the pro-
duction function is CES with parameter σ, that the disutility of labor is isoelastic with parameter
e, and that the initial tax schedule is CRP with parameter p < 1. Corollary 1 implies that the
resolvent series converges if
1
σEy
E [yεw (y)] =
(1− p) e
1 + pe+ (1− p) eσ
< 1,
where we used the expression for εw (y) derived in Section A.1 above. Since (1− p) e > 0, this
condition is satisfied if 1 + pe > 0. Recall that this condition is the second-order condition of the
individual problem, which is satisfied by Assumption 1 above. In particular, in the calibration to
the U.S. economy, we have p = 0.15 > 0 > − 1e ≈ −3 so this clearly holds.
C Proofs of Section 3
Elementary tax reforms. Suppose that the tax reform T is the step function T (y) = I{y≥y∗},
so that T ′ (y) = δ (y − y∗) is the Dirac delta function  that is, marginal tax rates are per-
turbed at income y∗ only. To apply formula (9) to this non-differentiable perturbation, con-
struct a sequence of smooth funtions ϕy∗, (y) such that δ (y − y∗) = lim→0 ϕy∗, (y), in the sense
that for all continuous functions ψ with compact support, ψ (y∗) = lim→0
´
R ϕy∗, (y)ψ (y) dy =
lim
´
Θ
ϕy∗, (y (θ
′)) {ψ (y (θ′)) y′ (θ′)} dθ′, where the second equality follows from a change of vari-
ables in the integral. This can be obtained by defining an absolutely integrable and smooth function
ϕy∗ (y) with compact support and
´
R ϕy∗ (y) dy = 1, and letting ϕy∗, (y) = 
−1ϕy∗(y ). Letting
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Φy∗, be such that Φ
′
y∗, = ϕy∗,, we then have, for all  > 0, the following labor supply incidence
formula:
lˆ(θ,Φy∗,) =− εr (θ) ϕy
∗, (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) − εw (θ)
ˆ
Θ
Γ (θ, θ′) εr (θ′)
ϕy∗, (y (θ
′))
1− T ′ (y (θ′))dθ
′.
Letting → 0, we obtain the incidence of the elementary tax reform at y∗:
lˆ (θ) =− εr (θ) δy
∗ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) − εw (θ)
Γ (θ, θ∗)
y′ (θ∗)
εr (θ
∗)
1
1− T ′ (y (θ∗))
=− εr (y) δy
∗ (y)
1− T ′ (y) − εw (y) Γ (y, y
∗) εr (y∗)
1
1− T ′ (y∗) ,
(39)
where in the last equality we let y = y (θ) and y∗ = y (θ∗), and we use the change of variables
Γ (y, y∗) = Γ(θ,θ
∗)
y′(θ∗) .
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3. The first-order effects of a tax reform Tˆ on individual
θ's tax payment are given by Tˆ (y (θ)) + [ wˆ(θ)w(θ) +
lˆ(θ)
l(θ) ]y (θ)T
′ (y (θ)) so that the first-order effects of
the tax reform Tˆ on government revenue are given by (changing variables from types θ to incomes
y (θ))
Rˆ =
ˆ
Tˆ (y) fY (y) dy +
ˆ
T ′ (y)
[
εSr (y)
εSw (y)
Tˆ ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y) +
(
1 +
1
εSw (y)
)
lˆ (y)
l (y)
]
yfY (y) dy, (40)
where lˆ (y) is the change in labor supply of agents with income initially equal to y. Using formula
(9), this implies that the effect of the elementary tax reform at income y∗ is given by
Rˆ (y∗) = 1 + T
′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
εSr (y
∗)
εSw (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) +
ˆ
R+
T ′ (y)
(
1 +
1
εSw (y)
)
. . .
×
[
−εr (y) δ (y − y
∗)
1− T ′ (y) −
1
1− T ′ (y∗)εw (y) Γ (y, y
∗) εr (y∗)
]
yfY (y)
1− FY (y∗)dy
= Rˆex (y∗) + T
′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)εr (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗)
(
1 + εSw (y
∗)
) 1
εDw (y
∗)
− εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
ˆ
R+
T ′ (y)
(
1 + εSw (y)
) Γ (y, y∗)
1 + εSw (y) /ε
D
w (y)
yfY (y)
1− FY (y∗)dy. (41)
Using Euler's theorem (24) easily leads to equation (17). If the disutility of labor is isoelastic and the
initial tax schedule is linear, then the marginal tax rate T ′ (y) and the elasticity εSw (y) are constant.
Applying equation (17) immediately implies that Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗).
Proof of Corollary 4. If the disutility of labor is isoelastic, the initial tax schedule is CRP, the
elasticities εSw, ε
D
w are constant and the integral in equation (41) can be simplified. The resulting
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expectation E[T ′ (y) yΓ(y,y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
] can be rewritten as
Cov
(
T ′ (y) ;
yΓ (y, y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
)
+
1
y∗fY (y∗)
E [T ′ (y)]E [yΓ (y, y∗)] .
But by Euler's theorem (equation (24)), we have 1
1+εSw/ε
D
w
E[yΓ (y, y∗)] = 1
εDw
y∗fY (y∗). Substituting
into the previous expression easily leads to (18). Now suppose in addition that the production
function is CES, so that the elasticities εr, εw are constant and Γ (y, y
∗) is given by formula (12)
with γ (y, y∗) = 1σEyy
∗fY (y∗). Substituting into (41) implies
Rˆ (y∗) =Rˆex (y∗) + εr
(
1 + εSw
) [ T ′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
1
σ
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) −
ˆ
R+
T ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y∗)γ (y, y
∗)
yfY (y) dy
1− FY (y∗)
]
.
Suppose first that p = 0, i.e., the initial tax schedule is linear. In this case, we have T ′ (y∗) = T ′ (y)
for all y, so that the term in the square brackets is equal to 0 by Euler's homogeneous function
theorem. More generally, with a nonlinear tax schedule, we can use expression (26) for γ (y, y∗) to
rewrite the term in square brackets as
1
1− T ′ (y∗)
1
σ
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗)
[
T ′ (y∗)−
ˆ
R+
T ′ (y)
y
Ey
fY (y) dy
]
.
Using the fact that
(
1 + εSw
)
εr
σ =
1+εSw
σ+εSw
εSr leads to equation (19). Note that we can also derive this re-
sult from equation (18): substituting for Γ (y, y∗) = 1σEy (1+
εSw
σ )y
∗fY (y∗) into Cov (T ′ (y) ; yΓ (y, y∗))
and using 1EyCov (T
′ (y) ; y) = 1EyE [yT
′ (y)]− E [T ′ (y)] easily leads to (19).
Incidence on social welfare. The first-order effect of a tax reform Tˆ on the government objective
G = 1λ
´
G (U (θ)) f (θ) dθ is given by
Gˆ =−
ˆ
Tˆ (y) g (y) fY (y) dy +
ˆ
(1− T ′ (y)) y wˆ (y)
w (y)
g (y) fY (y) dy,
where g (y) = G
′(U(θ))
λ denotes the marginal social welfare weight at income y, and where wˆ (y) is
the change in labor supply of agents with income initially equal to y. Therefore, we obtain that the
tax reform affects social welfare by
Wˆ = Rˆ+ Gˆ =
ˆ
(1− g (y)) Tˆ (y) fY (y) dy −
ˆ
T ′ (y)
1− T ′ (y)ε
S
r (y) Tˆ
′ (y) yfY (y) dy
+
ˆ [(
1 + εSw (y)
)
T ′ (y) + g (y) (1− T ′ (y))] wˆ (y)
w (y)
yfY (y) dy.
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Using equations (13) and (9), and applying this formula to the elementary tax reform at y∗, we get:
Wˆ (y∗) =
ˆ ∞
y∗
(1− g (y)) fY (y)
1− FY (y∗)dy − ε
S
r (y
∗)
T ′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗)
+
εr(y
∗)
εD(y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)ψ (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) −
εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
ˆ
ψ (y)
Γ (y, y∗)
1 +
εSw(y)
εDw (y)
yfY (y)
1− FY (y∗)dy,
(42)
where ψ (y) is defined by ψ (y) =
(
1 + εSw (y)
)
T ′ (y) + g (y) (1− T ′ (y)). Assume for simplicity that
the production function is CES, the disutility of labor is isoelastic, and the tax schedule is CRP.
The labor supply and demand elasticities are then constant, and we have Γ (y, y∗) = γ(y,y
∗)
1−εw/σ =
1
1−εw/σ
y∗fY (y∗)
σEy . It follows that the second line in the previous expression can be rewritten as
εr/σ
1− T ′ (y∗)
[
ψ (y∗)−
ˆ
R+
ψ (y)
y
Ey
fY (y) dy
]
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) .
Thus, the variable T ′ (y)
(
1 + εSw (y)
)
in equation (17), which measures the total impact of a wage
adjustment wˆ (y) on the government budget, is now replaced by the more general expression ψ (y).
Its second term comes from the fact that the share 1 − T ′ (y) of the income gain due to the wage
adjustment wˆ (y) is kept by the individual; this in turn raises social welfare in proportion to the
welfare weight g (y).
D Generalizations: preferences with income effects
In this section we extend the model of Section 1 to a general utility function over consumption
and labor supply U (c, l), where Uc, Ucc > 0 and Ul, Ull < 0. This specification allows for arbitrary
substitution and income effects.
Elasticity concepts. The first-order condition of the agent reads r (θ)w (θ)Uc (θ) + Ul (θ) = 0,
where Uc (θ) is a short-hand notation for Uc (y (θ)− T (y (θ)) , l (θ)) and r (θ) = 1− T ′ (y (θ)) is the
agent's retention rate. Differentiating this equation allows us to define the compensated (Hicksian)
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the retention rate, eSr (θ) ≡ r(θ)l(θ) ∂l(θ)∂r(θ)
∣∣∣
u cst
, and the income
effect, eR (θ) ≡ r (θ)w (θ) ∂l(θ)∂R , as follows:
ecr (θ) =
Ul (θ) /l (θ)
Ull (θ) +
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)2
Ucc (θ)− 2
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)
Ucl (θ)
,
eR (θ) =
−
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)2
Ucc (θ) +
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)
Ucl (θ)
Ull (θ) +
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)2
Ucc (θ)− 2
(
Ul(θ)
Uc(θ)
)
Ucl (θ)
.
(43)
The labor supply elasticity with respect to the wage is given by eSw (θ) = (1− p (y (θ))) ecr (θ)+eR (θ).
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As in Sections 1.2 and 2.1, we then normalize ec,Sr (θ) , e
S
R (θ) , e
S
w (θ) by 1 + p (y (θ)) e
c
r (θ) to get the
corresponding elasticities along the nonlinear budget constraint εc,Sr (θ) , ε
S
R (θ) , ε
S
w (θ), and further
by 1 + εSw (θ) /ε
D
w (θ) to get the elasticities of equilibrium labor ε
c
r (θ) , εR (θ) , εw (θ). The cross-wage
and own-wage elasticities γ (θ, θ′) , 1/εDw (θ) are defined as in (5) and (6). Finally, the resolvent
cross-wage elasticity Γ (θ, θ′) is defined as in (10).
Proposition 4 (Generalization of Proposition 1). The incidence of an arbitrary tax
reform Tˆ on individual labor supply is given by the following formula, which generalizes (9):
lˆ (θ) = lˆpe (θ) + εw (θ)
ˆ
Θ
Γ (θ, θ′) lˆpe (θ′) dθ′, (44)
where εw (θ), and Γ (θ, θ
′) are given by their generalized definitions above, and where
lˆpe (θ) ≡ −εr (θ) Tˆ
′ (y (θ))
1− T ′ (y (θ)) + εR (θ)
Tˆ (y (θ))
(1− T ′ (y (θ))) y (θ) .
The incidence on wages, utilities and government revenue are derived as the corresponding formulas
in Section 2.2.
The interpretation of this formula is identical to that of (9), except that the partial-equilibrium
impact of the reform lˆpe (θ) is modified: in addition to the substitution effect already described in
the quasilinear model, labor supply now also rises by an amount proportional to εR (θ) due to an
income effect induced by the higher total tax payment Tˆ (y (θ)) of agent θ. Note that the partial-
equilibrium formula for lˆpe (θ) is identical to that derived in models with exogenous wages by Saez
(2001) and Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2014), except that that now the elasticities εr (θ) and
εR (θ) take into account the own-wage effects ε
D
w (θ).
Proof of Proposition (4). Consider a tax reform Tˆ . The perturbed first order condition reads
(letting wθ = w (θ), etc. for conciseness):
0 =
[
1− T ′
(
(wθ + µwˆθ)
(
lθ + µlˆθ
))
− µTˆ ′ (wθlθ)
]
(wθ + µwˆθ) . . .
× Uc
[
(wθ + µwˆθ)
(
lθ + µlˆθ
)
− T
(
(wθ + µwˆθ)
(
lθ + µlˆθ
))
− µTˆ (wθlθ) , lθ + µlˆθ
]
+ Ul
[
(wθ + µwˆθ)
(
lθ + µlˆθ
)
− T
(
(wθ + µwˆθ)
(
lθ + µlˆθ
))
− µTˆ (wθlθ) , lθ + µlˆθ
]
.
A first-order Taylor expansion implies:
lˆθ
lθ
=
eR (θ) + (1− p (yθ)) ecr (θ)
1 + p (yθ) ecr (θ)
wˆθ
wθ
− e
c
r (θ)
1 + p (yθ) ecr (θ)
Tˆ ′ (yθ)
1− T ′ (yθ) −
eR (θ)
1 + p (yθ) ecr (θ)
Tˆ (yθ)
(1− T ′ (yθ)) yθ ,
where the first-order change in the wage w (θ) is given by equation (38). This leads to an integral
equation for lˆθ/lθ which can be solved following the same steps as in Proposition 1 to obtain equation
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(44).
Corollary 6 (Generalization of Corollary 4). Assume that the production function is
CES, the tax schedule is CRP, and the utility function has the form U (c, l) = c
1−η
1−η − l
1+ 1
ε
1+ 1ε
. The
revenue effect of the elementary tax reform at income y∗ is then given by
Rˆ (y∗) = Rˆex (y∗) + φεSr
T ′ (y∗)− T¯ ′
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
1− FY (y∗) (45)
− φεSr (1− p) η E
[
T ′ (y)− T¯ ′
1− T ′ (y) |y > y
∗
]
,
where T¯ ′ = E [yT ′ (y)] /Ey is the income-weighted average marginal tax rate in the economy and
where φ =
1+εSw
σ+εSw
.36 If in addition top incomes are Pareto distributed with parameter Π, we have
Rˆ(y∗) > Rˆex(y∗) as y∗ → ∞ if an only if Π > p + η − pη. In this case, the theoretical insights of
Section 3.2 remain qualitatively valid with income effects.
Proof of Corollary 6. Under the assumed functional form assumptions, the labor supply and
demand elasticities are constant and we have εc,Sr =
e
ηe(1−p)+pe+1 , ε
S
R = −(1 − p)ηεc,Sr (θ), and
εSw = (1− p) (1− η) εc,Sr . Since the production function is CES, the integral equation for lˆ (θ) /l (θ)
has a multiplicatively separable kernel and its solution for an elementary tax reform at income y(θ∗)
is given by:
lˆ (θ) =− εr(θ)
1− T ′(y(θ∗))
δ (y (θ)− y (θ∗))
1− F (θ∗) +
εR(θ)
(1− T ′(y(θ))y(θ)
I{θ>θ∗}
1− F (θ∗)
+
1
1−F (θ∗)εw(θ)
1− ´
Θ
εw(θ′)γ(θ, θ′)dθ′
[
−γ(θ, θ∗) εr(θ
∗)
1− T ′(y(θ∗)) +
ˆ θ
θ∗
γ(θ, θ′)
εR(θ
′)
(1− T ′(y(θ′))y(θ′)dθ
′
]
.
Therefore, the effect of the tax reform on government revenue, Rˆ = ´ Tˆ dF + ´ T ′y(lˆ + wˆ)dF , is
given by:
Rˆ(y(θ∗)) = Rˆex(y(θ∗))
+
1
1−F (θ∗)ε
S
r
1− T (y(θ∗))
(
1
εDw
1 + εSw
1 +
εSw
εDw
T ′(y(θ∗))y(θ∗)f(θ∗)−
ˆ
T ′(y(θ))y(θ)
γ(θ, θ∗) 1+ε
S
w
1+εSw/ε
D
w
1
1+εSw/ε
D
w
1− ´ εwγ(x, x)dx dF (θ)
)
+
ˆ θ
θ∗
1
1−F (θ∗)ε
S
R
(1− T ′(y(θ′))y(θ′)
(
1
εDw
1 + εSw
1 +
εSw
εDw
T ′(y(θ′))y(θ′)f(θ′)−
ˆ
T ′(y(θ))y(θ)
γ(θ, θ′) 1+ε
S
w
1+εSw/ε
D
w
1
1+εSw/ε
D
w
1− ´ εwγ(x, x)dx dF (θ)
)
dθ′.
This expression easily leads to (45). Now, since the tax schedule is CRP, we have T
′(y)−T¯ ′
1−T ′(y) =
yp
y¯ E[y
1−p]− 1 = 1−T¯ ′1−T ′(y) − 1. If incomes above y (θ∗) are Pareto distributed with tail parameter Π,
36Note that for η = 0, this formula reduces to equation (19). If η > 0 and the baseline tax
schedule is progressive, then the first and second general-equilibrium contributions have opposite
signs.
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we have E[yp|y > y∗] = ΠΠ−py∗p and hence
Rˆ(y∗) =Rˆex(y∗) + φεSr
[
Π
(
1− T¯ ′
1− T ′(y∗) − 1
)
− η(1− p)
(
Π
Π− p
1− T¯ ′
1− T ′(y∗) − 1
)]
. (46)
The term in square brackets is positive for y large enough if and only if Π > η(1 − p) ΠΠ−p , i.e.,
Π > η + p(1− η), because T ′(y)→ 1 as y →∞.
Equation (46) leads to simple calculations of the additional general equilibrium effect on gov-
ernment revenue. To illustrate this, we consider a parameterization that is based on the empirical
literature that estimates the impact of lottery wins on labor supply (Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote
(2001), Cesarini et al. (2017)). Using these wealth shocks they find that a one dollar increase in
wealth leads to a decrease in life-cycle labor income (in net present value) of 10-11 cents. Thus, we
calibrate our (static) model such that an increase in unearned income of 1 dollar implies a decrease
in earnings of 10-11 cents. Further, we set εc,Sr (θ) = 0.33 Chetty (2012). As in our benchmark
calibration in the main body, we assume that p = 0.15. To target the value of the lottery papers,
we set εSR (θ) = −0.08, which captures approximatey a 10-11 cents decrease in gross income if the
marginal tax rate is around 25%. The relationship εSR (θ) = −(1 − p)ηεc,Sr then yields a value of
η ≈ 0.29. Finally, the value for e that is consistent with εc,Sr = 0.33 is e = 0.38. Evaluating the
second term on the right hand side of (46) for these numbers reveals that it becomes positive for
income levels where the marginal tax rate is above 27.6%, a number that is slightly higher than the
income-weighted average marginal tax rate, which is equal to 26%. The income levels that corre-
spond to these tax rates are approximately $85,000 and $77,000. A last simple exercise is then to
evaluate general equilibrium revenue effect at a higher income level and compare it to the value that
is obtained in the absence of income effects. We do this comparison for the income level of $200,000
and find that the additional revenue effect coming from the endogeneity of wages is reduced by 28%
(32% respectively) if the elasticity of substitution is σ = 0.66 (σ = 3.1 respectively).
E Numerical simulations
Calibration of the model. We assume that incomes are log-normally distributed apart from the
top, where we append a Pareto distribution for incomes above $150,000. To obtain a smooth haz-
ard ratio
1−Fy(y)
yfy(y)
, we decrease the thinness parameter of the Pareto distribution linearly between
$150,000 and $350,000 and let it be constant at 1.5 afterwards (Diamond and Saez, 2011). In the last
step we use a standard kernel smoother to ensure differentiability of the hazard ratios at $150,000
and $350,000. We set the mean and variance of the lognormal distribution at 10 and 0.95, respec-
tively. The mean parameter is chosen such that the resulting income distribution has a mean of
$64,000, i.e., approximately the average US yearly earnings. The variance parameter was chosen
such that the hazard ratio at level $150,000 is equal to that reported by Diamond and Saez (2011,
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Fig.2).
CES production function with exogenous assignment. Denote by θy the type of an
agent who earns income y given the current tax system. Our first step is then the same as in
Saez (2001): we use the individual's first order condition 1 − T ′(y) = v′ ( yw ) 1w and the observed
income and marginal tax rate in the data, to back out the wage. As in Saez (2001), this gives
us both the wage w(θy) as well as the labor supply l(θy) =
y
w(θy)
that correspond to that income
level y, given the current tax schedule. Assume that the production function is CES with a given
parameter σ. Once we know the wage w(θy), the labor supply l(θy), and the density of incomes
fY (y), we can back out the primitive parameters a(θy) of the CES production function (3) using
the formula w(θy) = a(θy)[l(θy)fY (y)y
′(θy)/F (L )]1/σ, where we know everything but a(θy) and
y′(θy) ≡ dy(θ)dθ
∣∣∣
θy
. We can without loss of generality assume that θ is uniformly distributed in the
unit interval. This pins down y′(θy), since we observe the income percentiles in the data. We can
therefore infer the parameter a(θy) for each y.
Microfoundation with endogenous assignment. Now consider the model of Section A.2.
Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015, p.30) calibrate the following relation
A′1(θ,M(θ))
A(θ,M(θ)) = α1 +α2M(θ) with
α1 = 0.41 an α2 = 3.01. The parameter α1 represents the pure returns to skill and α2 represents the
complementarity with tasks. We extend this functional form as follows:
A′1(θ,M(θ))
A(θ,M(θ)) = α1(θ)+α2M(θ).
That is, we keep the linearity assumption as well as the value of the complementarity parameter
α2. But we replace the constant α1 with a function α1 (θ) that ensures that the empirical wage
distribution is exactly matched. Crucially, this allows us to depart from the restriction of a bounded
income distribution (which leads to inverse-U-shaped optimal tax rates) and to capture instead the
Pareto tail of the distribution. To estimate the relevant parameters α1 (θ), we start by calibrating
the wage distribution using the same method as Saez (2001), as explained in the main body of the
paper. We then plug the parameters of the Cobb Douglas function estimated by Ales, Kurnaz, and
Sleet (2015, p.27) into equation (33). Solving this equation gives us M(θ) for the current allocation.
We can then find the function α1(θ) such that the following equation holds:
w′(θ)
w(θ) = α1(θ)+α2M(θ),
where the left hand side is the empirical wage distribution.
Robustness: alternative baseline tax function. We propose several robustness exercises for
our tax incidence results. First, we depart from the assumption that the initial tax schedule is CRP
and consider an alternative calibration that differs in two ways: (i) we use a Gouveia-Strauss approxi-
mation for the income tax, taken from Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014); (ii) we also account for
the phasing-out of means-tested transfer programs that increase effective marginal tax rates, in par-
50
0 100 200 300 400 500
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
In
iti
al
 M
ar
gi
na
l T
ax
 R
at
es
0 100 200 300 400 500
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
R
ev
en
ue
 E
ffe
ct
Figure 5: Alternative specification of the baseline tax schedule. Bold curve: CRP tax sched-
ule. Dashed curve: Gouveia-Strauss approximation with additional distortions due to means-tested
transfers. Left panel: Right panel: Revenue gains of elementary tax reforms. Bold curve: exogenous
wages. Dashed curve: CES production function with σ = 3.1.
ticular for low incomes. The Gouveia-Strauss specification we use is the third to last column in Table
12 of Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014). For the phasing-out of transfers, we use parametric
estimates from Guner, Rauh, and Ventura (2017), namely, T (I) = exp(−1.816) exp(−4.29I)I−0.006
where I is expressed in multiples of average income (we use a CPI deflator and express everything
in terms of year 2000 dollars). Figure 5 shows the resulting schedule of marginal tax rates (left
panel) and the normalized revenue gains of elementary tax reforms for a CES parameter σ = 3.1
(right panel). The additional general-equilibrium revenue effects due to the endogeneity of wages
are naturally smaller in magnitude than for a CRP initial tax schedule because of the very large
bottom marginal tax rates. Nevertheless, the general insight of Figure 2 is unchanged.
Robustness: incidence on social welfare. Second, we depart from our focus on revenue
effects (i.e., Rawlsian welfare) and consider alternative concave social welfare functions G(u) = u
1−κ
1−κ .
The CES parameter in Figure 6 is σ = 3.1. Welfare gains are expressed in terms of public funds.
For a low taste for redistribution (κ = 1, left panel), the welfare gains of raising tax rates on high
incomes are reversed due to general equilibrium. For a stronger taste for redistribution (κ = 3, right
panel), general equilibrium effects imply that raising the top tax rates is more desirable. On the
one hand, general equilibrium effects raise tax revenue (as in thee main body of the paper). On the
other hand, the implied wage decreases for the working poor make them worse-off. In case of very
strong redistributive tastes (i.e., when the social marginal welfare weights decrease sufficiently fast
with income, the extreme case being the Rawlsian welfare criterion), the tax revenue gain gets a
higher weight (since these gains are used for lump-sum redistribution). If relatively richer workers
(for whom the lump-transfer is less important relative to the very poor) still have significant welfare
weights, the wage effects dominates.
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Figure 6: Welfare effect of elementary tax reforms for the social welfare function G(u) = u
1−κ
1−κ .
Left panel: κ = 1. Right panel: κ = 3.
F Optimal taxation
In the model with exogenous wages (Diamond, 1998), the optimum schedule T ′pe (·) is characterized
by
T ′pe (y
∗)
1− T ′pe (y∗)
=
1
εSr (y
∗)
(1− g¯ (y∗)) 1− FY (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
.
Corollary 7 (Optimal tax schedule in general equilibrium). The welfare-maximizing
tax schedule T satisfies: for all y∗ ∈ R+,
T ′ (y∗)
1− T ′
pe
(y∗)
=
1
εSr (y
∗)
1− FY (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
{
1− g¯ (y∗) + εr (y∗) . . .
×
ˆ
R+
[ψ (y∗)− ψ (y)] Γ (y, y
∗)
1 +
εSr (y
∗)
εDr (y
∗)
yfY (y)
1− FY (y∗)dy
}
,
(47)
where ψ (y) =
(
1 + εSw (y)
)
T ′ (y) + g (y) (1− T ′ (y)). This optimal tax formula (47) can be straight-
forwardly transformed into an integral equation in T ′ (·), which can then be solved using similar
techniques as in Section 2.1.
Proof of Corollary 7. The impact of the elementary tax reforms on social welfare is given by
(42). Using Euler's theorem (24), imposing Wˆ (y∗) = 0 for all y∗ and rearranging the terms leads to
T ′ (y∗)
1− T ′ (y∗) =
1
εSr (y
∗)
(1− g¯ (y)) 1− FY (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
+
εr (y
∗)
εSr (y
∗)
1
1− T ′ (y∗)
ˆ
R+
[ψ (y∗)− ψ (y)] Γ (y, y
∗)
1 +
εSw(y)
εDw (y)
yfY (y)
y∗fY (y∗)
dy.
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Multiplying this equation by 1− T ′ (y∗) and solving for T ′ (y∗) easily leads to (47).
Proof of Proposition 3. If the production function is CES, we have εDw (y) = σ and Γ (y, y
∗) =
y∗fY (y∗)
σE[(1+ 1σ εSw(x))−1x]
. Using these expressions, formula (47) can then be rewritten as
[
1 +
1
σ
(g (y∗)− 1)
]
T ′ (y∗) =
1− T ′ (y∗)
εr (y∗)
(1− g¯ (y∗)) 1− FY (y
∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
+
1
σ
g (y∗)− A
σ
,
where A is a constant (independent of y∗) equal to
A ≡ 1
E[ y
1+ 1σ ε
S
w(y)
]
ˆ
g (y) +
[
(1− g (y)) + εSw (y)
]
T ′ (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
yfY (y) dy. (48)
The previous equation can then be rewritten as
T ′ (y∗) =
1
εr(y∗)
(1− g¯ (y∗)) 1−FY (y∗)y∗fY (y∗) + 1σ (g (y∗)−A)
1 + 1εr(y∗) (1− g¯ (y∗))
1−FY (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)
+ 1σ (g (y
∗)− 1)
(49)
We now show that A = 1, which easily leads to expression (21). Consider the following tax reform:
Tˆ2 (y) = − εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)γ (y, y
∗) (1− T ′ (y)) y,
Tˆ ′2 (y) = −
εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)γ (y, y
∗) (1− T ′ (y)− yT ′′ (y)) ,
where γ (y, y∗) = 1σ
y∗fY (y∗)´
xfY (x)dx
is independent of y since the production function is CES. (It is easy
to show that this is the tax reform that cancels out the general equilibrium effects on individual
labor supply of the elementary reform at y∗.) Tedious but straightforward algebra shows that the
incidence of this counteracting tax reform Tˆ2 on social welfare is given by
Wˆ(Tˆ2) =
ˆ
Wˆ (y∗) Tˆ ′2 (y∗) (1− FY (y∗)) dy∗
=− 1
σ
εr (y
∗)
1− T ′ (y∗)
y∗fY (y∗)´
xfY (x) dx
{ˆ
(1− g (y)) (1− T ′ (y)) yfY (y) dy . . .
−
ˆ
εw (y)
([
1 +
1
σ
(g (y)− 1)
]
T ′ (y)− 1
σ
g (y)
)
yfY (y) dy
− 1
σ
´
εw (y) ydFY (y)
E
[
x
1+ 1σ ε
S
w(x)
] ˆ 1
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (x)
[(
1− g (x) + εSw (x)
)
T ′ (x) + g (x)
]
xdFY (x)
}
.
Using expression (48) for A and imposing that Wˆ(Tˆ2) = 0 leads to
ˆ
(1− g (y)) + εSw (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
T ′ (y) yfY (y) dy =
ˆ
(1− g (y)) + 1−Aσ εSw (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
yfY (y) dy. (50)
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Now compare expressions (48) and (50). These two equations imply
ˆ [
(1− g (y)) + εSw (y)
]
T ′ (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
yfY (y) dy = E
[
A− g (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
y
]
=
ˆ
(1− g (y)) + 1−Aσ εSw (y)
1 + 1σ ε
S
w (y)
yfY (y) dy.
Solving for A implies A = 1.
Proof of Corollary 5. Suppose that in the data (i.e., given the current tax schedule and constant
top tax rate), the income distribution has a Pareto tail, so that the (observed) hazard rate 1−FY (y
∗)
yfY (y∗)
converges to a constant. We show that under these assumptions, the income distribution at the
optimum tax schedule is also Pareto distributed at the tail with the same Pareto coefficient. We
have
1− FY (y(θ))
y(θ)fY (y(θ))
=
1− F (θ)
y(θ)
y′(θ)f(θ)
=
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
θy′(θ)
y(θ)
=
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
εy,θ, (51)
where we define the income elasticity εy,θ ≡ d ln y (θ) /d ln θ. To compute this elasticity, use the
individual first order condition (1) with isoelastic disutility of labor to get l(θ) = r(θ)ew(θ)e, where
r(θ) is agent θ's retention rate. Thus we have εl,θ ≡ d ln l(θ)d ln θ = ed ln r(θ)d ln θ + ed lnw(θ)d ln θ . But since the
production function is CES, we have
d lnw(θ)
d ln θ
=
d ln a (θ)
d ln θ
− 1
σ
d ln l (θ)
d ln θ
− 1
σ
d ln f (θ)
d ln θ
=
θa′ (θ)
a (θ)
− 1
σ
εl,θ − 1
σ
θf ′ (θ)
f (θ)
.
Using this expression, we obtain
εl,θ =e
[
θa′ (θ)
a (θ)
− 1
σ
εl,θ − 1
σ
θf ′ (θ)
f (θ)
+
θr′(θ)
r(θ)
]
.
Since we assume that the second derivative of the optimal marginal tax rate, T ′′ (y), converges to zero
for high incomes, we have limθ→∞ r′(θ) = 1. Moreover, the variables
θa′(θ)
a(θ) and
θf ′(θ)
f(θ) are primitive
parameters that do not depend on the tax rate. Assuming that they converge to constants as θ →∞,
we obtain that limθ→∞ εl,θ is constant, and hence εy,θ = εl,θ + εw,θ =
(
1 + 1e
)
εl,θ converges to a
constant independent of the tax rate. Therefore, the hazard rate of the income distribution at the
optimum tax schedule, given by (51), converges to the same constant as the hazard rate of incomes
observed in the data. Now let y∗ →∞ in equation (21), to obtain an expression for the optimal top
tax rate τ∗ = limy∗→∞ T ′ (y∗). We have seen that limy∗→∞ εr (y∗) = e1+e/σ . Furthermore assume
that limy∗→∞ g (y∗) = g¯, so that limy∗→∞ g¯ (y∗) = g¯. Therefore (21) implies
τ∗
1− τ∗ =
1 + e/σ
e
(1− g¯) 1
Π
+
g¯ − 1
σ
=
1− g¯
Πe
+
1− g¯
Πσ
+
g¯ − 1
σ
,
where Π is the Pareto parameter. Solving for τ∗ leads to (22).
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